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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
TRAVIS BERTOCH, : Case No. 20030111-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Pursuant to rule ll(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, defendant entered a 
conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third 
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 5 8-3 7-8(2)(a)(i) (2002), reserving the right 
to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Is defendant precluded from attacking the validity of the weapons pat-down on 
appeal, where he conceded below that the pat-down was justified and argued only that its 
scope was exceeded when the trooper allegedly seized non-weapon contraband? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Below, defendant did not question the justification for the weapons pat-down, 
consequently, he is precluded from raising the issue for the first time on appeal. See State 
v. Richins, 2004 UT App 36, ffif 8-11, 86 P.3d 759 (reaffirming mandate that specific 
objections must be raised in the trial court or be waived on appeal); State v. Rochell, 850 
P.2d 480, 484 n.3 (Utah App. 1993) (strictly applying preservation requirement to appeal 
arising from conditional guilty plea). 
2. Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's motion to suppress his pre-Miranda 
statements on the ground that the statements were volunteered and/or made during a non-
custodial investigative detention? 
This Court reviews "'the factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant 
or deny a motion to suppress evidence . . . under the deferential clearly-erroneous standard, 
and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion given 
the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts.'" See State v. Zesiger, 2003 
UT App 37,1f 7, 65 P.3d 314 (quoting State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996) (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 
1994)), cert, denied, 73 P.3d 946 (Utah 2003). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution generally control 
the issues raised on appeal, but their wording is not determinative. Copies of the 
amendments and any cited statutes or rules are attached in Addendum A. 
2 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 18, 2001, defendant was charged with third degree felony possession 
of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), class B misdemeanor possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana), class B misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia 
(marijuana pipe and rolling papers), and improper positioning of a license plate, a class C 
misdemeanor (R. 1-5). Following a preliminary hearing on March 14,2002, defendant was 
bound over for trial (R. 31-32; R294: 28-29). 
Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the seized drugs and drug paraphernalia 
and statements made at the scene (R. 47-136, 172-80). See Addendum C (Defendant's 
Motion andMemoranda). The State opposed the motion (R. 139-52). Defendant submitted 
the matter without an evidentiary hearing or oral argument based on the parties' memoranda, 
a transcript of the preliminary hearing, and the police reports (R. 77-136; R295: 2-5). On 
September 30, 2002, the trial court denied the motion to suppress (R. 224; R287: 3-6). See 
Addendum B (Ruling). No written findings were entered (R. 285).l 
On October 4,2002, defendant entered a guilty plea to third degree felony possession 
and the remaining charges were dismissed (R296: 2-10). The Statement of Defendant in 
Advance of Plea did not condition the guilty plea on a reservation of the right to appeal (R. 
229-36). During the plea hearing, however, the trial court sua sponte asked defendant if he 
was "reserving the right to appeal my ruling on your motion to suppress or not" (R296: 5). 
1
 Interestingly, the judge included in the record his handwritten notes outlining his 
oral ruling (R. 295). The notes are nearly identical to the oral ruling and both fully reflect 
the court's reasoning. 
3 
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Defense counsel responded, "Yes, your honor, I would like to do that" (id.). The prosecutor 
did not respond (id.).2 
On December 16, 2002, the trial court sentenced defendant to the statutory term of 
imprisonment of zero-to-five years, but suspended the sentence and placed him on probation 
on condition that he serve a year in jail, pay a fine, and complete an in-patient substance 
abuse program (R. 242-44; R288: 2-8). Confusion arose over defendant's notice of appeal 
and the court extended the time for filing (R. 246-56). On February 6, 2003, defendant 
timely appealed (R. 257-58). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
On September 19,2001, around 9:00 p.m., Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Christopher 
Witte observed a vehicle on SR 201 near Redwood Road (R294: 5-6).4 The vehicle had no 
rear trunk lid and no license plate was attached (R294: 6). The trooper thought a license 
plate was lying flat on the ledge near the rear window, but could not see its numbers (R296: 
2
 A conditional plea requires the consent of the prosecutor, which consent should 
be affirmatively reflected in the record. See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 1 l(i) (Add. A). See also 
State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that the record must 
indicate the conditional nature of a plea without any ambiguity). Despite the prosecutor's 
silence in this case, it is clear he was aware of the conditional nature of the plea and did 
not oppose it (R296: 2-10). 
3
 The facts are stated in the light most favorable to the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to suppress. See State v. Chansamore, 2003 UT App 107, \ 1 n.l, 69 
P.3d293. 
4
 The State agrees with defendant that the preliminary hearing transcript 
mistakenly refers to Trooper Witte as Trooper Woody. 
4 
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6, 13).5 The trooper knew that when a vehicle is stolen, its license plate is often removed 
(R294: 15). Additionally, Utah law requires a license plate to be properly displayed (R287: 
4). See Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-403(3) (1998) (Add A). The trooper followed the vehicle 
for a few minutes until it reached a safe location on 1-15 and pulled it over (R294: 13-14). 
Defendant was alone in the vehicle (R294: 7). When the trooper approached the 
driver's window, he immediately "smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating 
from" defendant (R294:7; R287:3). Defendant's eyes were blood-shot and, as they initially 
conversed, the trooper noted that defendant's speech was slowed (R. 79-80). The trooper, 
whose duties and training included DUI enforcement and drug recognition, believed 
defendant was possibly impaired and asked him if he had been drinking; defendant responded 
that he had had two beers (R. 79; R294: 8-10, 14). The trooper asked defendant for his 
driver's license and registration, which defendant produced, but the trooper decided to 
conduct field sobriety tests before "running" the documents (R294: 8, 14). 
The trooper asked defendant to step out of the vehicle and "patted him down for my 
safety just to check for weapons" by patting the outside of defendant's clothing at the 
waistline and pockets (R294: 7-8,15,17). The trooper felt a hard object in defendant's left 
pants pocket which he suspected was a small marijuana pipe (R294: 9,1). The trooper said, 
"This is a pipe" (R294: 19). Defendant volunteered that it was a marijuana pipe and said he 
had a baggie of marijuana in his other pocket (R294: 9,17-18; R287: 3-4). Later, defendant 
5
 It is unclear if the trooper saw the plate before or after he approached the stopped 
vehicle, but in either case, he could not read the plate's numbers (R294: 6, 13). 
5 
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volunteered that he had smoked marijuana the previous evening (R. 79; R287: 3). The 
trooper did not remove the pipe or marijuana and instructed defendant to leave the items in 
his pockets while he performed the field sobriety tests (R294: 9). 
Defendant failed the field sobriety tests "miserably" and was arrested for DUI (R294: 
8, 24-25; R. 80, 99).6 Incident to the arrest, the trooper handcuffed defendant and removed 
the pipe and marijuana from his pockets (R294: 9, 24; R287: 4). The pipe contained burnt 
marijuana residue (R294: 9). Defendant's vehicle was impounded and searched; zig-zag 
rolling papers, typically used to smoke marijuana, were found inside (R294: 12). A blood 
draw was taken with defendant's consent (R294:10). Defendant was advised of his Miranda 
6
 Defendant exhibited multiple indicators of impairment. His breath smelled of 
alcohol, his speech was slow, his eyes were red and blood shot, the back of his tongue had 
a greenish tint and blisters, his eyes lacked smooth pursuit, both eyes exhibited distinct 
nystagmus at maximum deviation, he swayed, he had to raise his arms for balance, and he 
stepped off the line to maintain his balance (R. 79-80, 99; R294: 8, 24-25). The trooper 
agreed that defendant was not the "drunkest person" he had seen, but believed he was 
sufficiently impaired that he could not safely drive (R294: 8, 25). A subsequent 
preliminary screen of defendant's blood showed an alcohol level of .01 or no alcohol 
impairment and was negative for the presence of marijuana or metabolite (R294: 23; 
105). But see David Sandler, Expert and Opinion Testimony of Law Enforcement 
Officers Regarding Identification of Drug Impaired Drivers, 23 U. Haw. L. Rev. 151, 
155 (2002), (noting that a negative blood result does not necessarily rule out drug 
impairment or support that the individual is drug free). The final toxicology report was 
not included in the record prior to defendant pleading guilty. 
For purposes of the motion to suppress, defendant admitted that he failed the field 
tests and exhibited signs of impairment (R. 51-53). In fact, he argued that his impairment 
rendered him incapable of knowingly waiving his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (R. 66-68). See Add. C. The court found that there was "no 
testimony whatsoever in any way that Mr. Bertoch was incapacitated to a point that he 
couldn't understand Miranda and denied the motion to suppress his post-Miranda 
statements (R. 287: 5). Defendant has abandoned this argument on appeal. 
6 
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rights and transported to jail (id.). During booking, the jailers removed a small plastic case 
from defendant, which defendant admitted contained methamphetamine (R294: 10-12). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Pat-Down: Defendant conceded below that the stop and pat-down were justified. He 
challenged only the seizure of the non-weapon contraband in his pockets, which seizure he 
alleged occurred during the weapons pat-down. The trial court properly rejected the 
argument because it found that no item was removed during the pat-down, but only incident 
to defendant's subsequent arrest. Defendant does not challenge this finding on appeal. 
Instead, for the first time, he attacks the weapons pat-down. Because defendant did 
not challenge the justification for the pat-down below, the issue is not preserved or reserved 
by the conditional plea. Consequently, the entirety of defendant's Point I, which is 
predicated on the alleged illegality of the pat-down, should be summarily rejected. 
Moreover, even if, arguendo, defendant's challenge on appeal were preserved and the 
pat-down determined to be illegal, defendant would not prevail. The trial court found that 
no physical evidence was obtained as a result of the pat-down, but only independently 
incident to the arrest and vehicle impound. Consequently, whether a weapons pat-down was 
permissible or not, the net outcome of the suppression ruling is the same: the drugs and 
paraphernalia were lawfully seized and, therefore, are admissible against defendant. 
Pre-Miranda Statements: A temporary traffic detention does not constitute "custody" 
for Fifth Amendment purposes and, therefore, questioning during such an encounter does not 
require a Miranda warning. Additionally, regardless of the nature of the setting, a suspect's 
7 
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volunteered statements do not implicate Miranda. Here, the trial court correctly denied 
defendant's motion to suppress his pve-Miranda statements because the statements were 
volunteered and/or did not result from custodial interrogation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINTI 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE A CHALLENGE TO 
THE WEAPONS PAT-DOWN BELOW, HE MAY NOT ATTACK ITS 
VALIDITY FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
Rule 1 l(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, permits a defendant to enter a guilty 
plea while reserving his right to appeal an "adverse determination of any specified pretrial 
motion." See Add. A. Reservation of the right to appeal, however, does not excuse 
preservation of the issue raised. See State v. Richins, 2004 UT App 36, ^  8-11, 86 P.3d 759 
(reaffirming that preservation rule applies to all issues raised on appeal and holding that a 
challenge under one subsection of a rule did not preserve a challenge under a different 
subsection of same rule); State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 360-61 (Utah 1993) (holding that 
preservation rule's specificity requirement is not met by casually referencing an issue below, 
but requires active presentation to the trial court of relevant legal authority and evidence); 
State v. Rochell, 850 P.2d 480,484 n.3 (Utah App. 1993) (strictly applying preservation rule 
in appeal from conditional plea and refusing to consider suppression theory raised for the 
first appeal). Indeed, rule 1 l(i) only permits appeals from pretrial motions presented to and 
ruled upon by the trial court. Cf. State v. Rivera, 9A3 P.2d 1344,1345-46 (Utah 1997); State 
v. Montoya, 887 P.2d 857, 860 (Utah 1994) (both holding that "plain language55 of rule 11 
8 
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permits conditional appeals from the denial of any specified pretrial motion). In sum, rule 
1 l(i) expands the category of potential appellants, but does not diminish their obligation to 
preserve arguments below or face waiver on appeal. See Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold Isreal, 
5 Criminal Procedure § 21.6(b) n.51 (2d Ed & 2004 Pocket Part). 
Here, defendant impermissibly argues for the first time on appeal that the weapons 
pat-down conducted pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), was not justified (Br.Aplt. 
at 15-25).1 On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erroneously found the pat-down 
7
 Terry, 392 U.S. at 23, concluded that "[w]hen an officer is justified in believing 
that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed 
and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly 
unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine 
whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical 
harm." The Court held that if an officer could articulate a reasonable basis to suspect an 
individual was armed, the officer could frisk "every portion of the [person's] body," 
including patting down the individual's "arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin 
and area about the testicles, and the entire surface of the legs down to the feet." Id. at 11 
n.13 (citation and quotation marks omitted). See also State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, 78 
P.3d 590 (extensively discussing suspicion necessary for Terry frisk). 
Here, the trooper did not conduct a full Terry frisk, but briefly patted down 
defendant's waistline and his shirt and pants pockets for weapons before proceeding to 
the field sobriety tests (R294: 17). See United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 843 (5th 
Cir.) (recognizing that a similar pat-down was less that the "intrusive exploration of a 
detainee's body . . . envisioned in Terry), cert denied, 513 U.S. 829 (1994). During the 
preliminary hearing, the trooper briefly stated his safety concerns based on his suspicions 
that the vehicle was stolen and defendant was impaired (R294: 7-8, 15, 17). See State v. 
Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 984 (Utah App. 1992) (reaffirming supreme court's recognition 
in State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985), that "'it is not unlikely that a person 
engaged in stealing another person's property would arm himself against the possibility 
that another person will appear unexpectedly and object strenuously'"). When defendant 
subsequently moved to suppress, he did not contest the reasonableness or sufficiency of 
the officer's explanation (R. 59-61, 175-76) and, consequently, there was no need to 
present additional evidence. See Richins, 2004 UT App 36, f^lf 1 & 11 (recognizing that 
when a defendant fails to raise an issue, the court has no reason to take evidence on the 
issue or enter full findings to resolve it). 
9 
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permissible without considering the totality of the circumstances (id). According to 
defendant, the DUI arrest would not have occurred "but for" the illegal pat-down and, 
consequently, the physical and oral evidence seized incident to that arrest must also be 
suppressed (Br.Aplt at 29). Additionally, defendant claims that his statements at the scene 
were not voluntary, but compelled through exploitation of the police illegality and, therefore, 
must be suppressed (Br.Aplt. at 30-36). None of these arguments were presented to the trial 
court. See Add. C. 
Below, defendant did not seek an evidentiary hearing or oral argument (R295: 2-5). 
Instead, he submitted his motion to suppress on his extensive memoranda, a transcript of the 
preliminary hearing, and the police reports (R. 47-136, 172-80). See Add. C. Yet, in some 
38 pages of legal memoranda, defendant never attacked the weapons pat-down, only the 
seizure of the pipe and baggie (R. 59-62, 64-66, 173-76). Moreover, he did not simply fail 
to attack the pat-down, he affirmatively conceded its permissibility (id.). His claim below 
was that the permissible weapons search did not justify the seizure of the non-weapon 
contraband (R. 64-66). According to defendant, this case was indistinguishable from 
Maryland v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993), in which the validity of the pat-down search 
was also not challenged, only its scope (id.). In Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 377, the United 
States Supreme Court accepted without analysis the reasonableness of the Terry frisk 
because Dickerson did not challenge it. The Court only addressed the issue of when non-
weapon contraband could be seized during a weapons frisk. See id. at 378. The Court 
concluded that contraband could be seized if its illegal character was immediately apparent, 
10 
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without resort to further search. See id. at 373-76. Based on this holding, defendant argued 
below: 
Applying Dickerson to this case, then, Trooper Witte could conduct a Terry 
frisk to determine whether Mr. Bertoch was carrying a weapon but could not 
seize an item that was not a weapon (and that could have been a lawful 
tobacco pipe), then continue to search the pipe located in the left pocket by 
searching the right pocket and seizing a "small baggie" which was clearly not 
a weapon and constituted no threat to Trooper Witte's safety or the safety of 
anyone else. 
(R. 65-66) (emphasis added). See also R. 59-62,173-76 for defendant's similar concessions. 
Defendant's Dickerson argument was legally correct, but factually inaccurate. The 
trooper admitted that he strongly suspected the pipe in defendant's pocket was contraband, 
but could not positively determine whether it was a tobacco or marijuana pipe from its feel 
(R294: 9, 17-22). Consequently, Dickerson did preclude its removal. But defendant's 
underlying factual assumption—that the pipe and baggie were actually removed and seized 
during the pat-down—was incorrect. The preliminary hearing testimony established and the 
trial court correctly found that the pipe and baggie were not removed until defendant failed 
the field tests and was arrested for DUI (R294: 9; R287: 4). Their removal was, therefore, 
independent of the pat-down and solely incident to defendant's lawful arrest (R287:4). See 
State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, ^  14,994 P.2d 1278; State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245,1249 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996) (both recognizing that when a driver is 
arrested for any offense, including a misdemeanor offense, a search of the driver and vehicle 
may be conducted incident to the arrest). 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendant also asserted below that he was in "custody" from the inception of the stop 
when the trooper smelled alcohol on his breath (R. 58-59). Because a Miranda warning was 
not given, defendant claimed that his ensuing statements—that he drank two beers, smoked 
marijuana the night before, and had a marijuana pipe and marijuana in his pockets—must be 
suppressed (R. 58-59). See discussion, Point II He did not argue below that these 
statements were involuntary (id.). Nor did he argue that his detention was unlawful (id.). 
To the contrary, defendant conceded that the license plate violation supported the stop and 
detention and that his "skinhead" appearance unfairly enhanced the officer's suspicions that 
the vehicle was stolen (R295: 3; R. 71-76, 178-79).8 
In sum, the thrust of defendant's arguments below was that the pipe and marijuana 
should be suppressed because they were non-weapon contraband seized during an otherwise 
legitimate Terry weapons search, and that his statements at the scene should be suppressed 
because he was effectively under arrest once the trooper smelled alcohol on his breath (R. 
174-76). None of defendant's arguments below challenged the validity of the stop, detention, 
pat-down, or arrest. See Add. C. Consequently, the trial court only summarily noted that the 
stop, detention, pat-down, and arrest were "appropriate" or "lawful," and then proceeded to 
specifically rule on the arguments defendant raised, to wit: (1) whether defendant's at-the-
8
 At the time of the stop, defendant was heavily tattooed and his head was shaved 
(R 71-76, 178-79). According to defendant, he looked like a "skinhead" or 
"straightedger," which prevented the officer from giving him the "benefit of the doubt" 
(id.). The trial court found no basis to conclude that the trooper unfairly profiled 
defendant based on his appearance (R287: 6). Defendant does not challenge this finding 
on appeal. 
12 
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scene statements should be suppressed because no Miranda warning was given; (2) whether 
non-weapon items were seized during the course of the weapons pat-down; (3) whether the 
zig-zag papers were illegally seized; (4) whether defendant was too impaired to waive his 
Miranda rights after he was arrested, (5) whether the methamphetamine should be 
suppressed because the police varied in their descriptions of its plastic case, and (6) whether 
the detention continued due to improper profiling because defendant appeared to be a 
"skinhead" (R287: 3-6; R285). See Add. B. The court correctly and properly rejected 
defendant's claims (id.). 
On appeal, defendant abandons his arguments below, but for the claim that his at-the-
scene statements should be suppressed because no Miranda warning was given. See 
discussion, Point II. He still concedes that the stop was proper, but now argues that the DUI 
arrest was invalid because the field sobriety tests were "subjective" and "the DUI arrest was 
determined by the results of the illegal frisk rather than the results of the field sobriety tests" 
(Br.Aplt. at 28-29). Not only is this argument not preserved, it contradicts defendant's 
admissions and arguments in the trial court. Compare Br.Aplt. at 28-29, with R. 66-68. 
Similarly, defendant abandons his trial court argument that the contraband was 
impermissibly seized during an otherwise permissible weapons pat-down (Br.Aplt. at 6-7, 
28). Instead, defendant now argues that the weapons pat-down was illegal and 
everything—the statements, arrest, and contraband—should be suppressed because they were 
obtained through exploitation of its illegality (Br.Aplt. at 12-35). See State v. Thurrnan, 846 
P.2d 1256, 1262-64 (Utah 1993) (recognizing that where a prior police illegality proceeds 
13 
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an otherwise valid search, the prosecution must establish that the legal search did not occur 
through exploitation of the illegality). Defendant's Point I, therefore, is predicated on one 
claim of error, that the trial court failed to fully consider the totality of the circumstances of 
the detention before stating the pat-down was lawful {Br.Aplt at 12-35). But defendant's 
own actions negated any need to examine these circumstances: defendant admitted that a 
weapons pat-down was justified (R. 59-61, 173-76), and, therefore, the trial court had no 
reason to further question its justification. See Richins, 2004 UT App 36, f^ f 8 & 11 
(recognizing that a trial court is not provided notice that a full ruling is required when a 
defendant fails to raise a specific objection). 
This Court should summarily reject consideration of defendant's unpreserved 
arguments. But even if assuming, arguendo, that the challenge to the pat-down was 
preserved and this Court determined it illegal, defendant would still not prevail on appeal for 
purposes of withdrawing his conditional plea. 
The trial court found that no items were obtained as a result of the pat-down, but were 
seized independently incident to defendant's subsequent DUI arrest (R287: 4). On appeal, 
defendant does not challenge this factual finding, but claims—for the first time—that the 
DUI arrest was not the result of his failed sobriety tests, but was a product of the allegedly 
unlawful pat-down {Br.Aplt at 28-31). Aside from being unpreserved, the argument has no 
evidentiary basis and is contradicted by defendant's factual admissions below. Compare 
Br.Aplt at 28-31, with R. 59-62, 173-76. Consequently, even if the pat-down were 
determined to be illegal, only suppression of defendant's statements made during the pat-
14 
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down would result. Accord Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262-64. However, this result would not 
entitle defendant to vacation of his guilty plea. 
Rule 1 l(i) requires a defendant to "prevail on appeal" before his conditional guilty 
plea may be withdrawn {Add. A). "To prevail on appeal" is a term of art, which means more 
than simply prevailing on an issue. SeeA.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 
2002 UT App 73, f 16, 47 P.3d 92. Utah recognizes various tests for determining who 
prevails, but all the standards are based on a common sense comparison of what a party 
sought to gain with what the party actually gained, that is, a party's "net judgment."See J. 
Pochynok Co., Inc. v. Smedsrud, 2003 UT App 375, f 12, 80 P.3d 563; Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah App. 1989). Even under the most 
generous standard, a party claiming to have prevailed must "at a minimum . . . be able to 
point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship between [the 
parties]" in a significant and not "purely technical or de minimus" way. See Texas State 
Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Independent School District, 489 U.S. 782, 791-92 (1989) (in 
context of civil rights claim). Moreover, when multiple issues are involved, a party must win 
more than a single claim since there can never be two "prevailing parties." See R. T. Nielson 
Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ffif 22-26, 40 P.3d 1119. 
Rule ll(i) does not require that a reserved pretrial motion be dispositive of the 
prosecution of the case. See Rivera, 943 P.2d at 1345-46; Montoya, 887 P.2d at 859-60. 
But the rule does require that a defendant prevail on the appeal of the reserved motion. See 
Add. A. Stated differently, a defendant, who conditionally pleads guilty, must obtain on 
15 
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appeal a "net judgment" in his favor or otherwise significantly change the relationship of the 
parties in connection with the reserved motion. Cf. Rivera, 943 P.2d at 1346 (recognizing 
that a conditional plea should be permitted to be withdrawn when the appellate ruling places 
the parties on new footing in any negotiations of the case). Thus, winning one part of a 
multi-issue motion to suppress is not "prevailing on appeal" unless the "win" significantly 
changes the outcome of the trial court's denial of the motion. Here, the legality of the pat-
down does not impact the validity of the searches incident to arrest, impound, and booking 
and, consequently, does not change the overall outcome of the motion to suppress. See State 
v. Zesiger, 2003 UT App 37, f 11, 65 P.3d 314 (reaffirming "independent source doctrine" 
which precludes suppression where evidence is in fact obtained from a source independent 
of any illegality). See also State v. James, 2000 UT 80, fflj 14-16, 13 P.3d 576 (clarifying 
that where evidence would hypothetically have been inevitably lawfully discovered, 
suppression is not warranted). 
In sum, defendant's arguments are waived and, even the arguments were preserved, 
resolution of them would not result in a net change in the denial of the motion to suppress. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANTS MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE A MIRANDA WARNING WAS NOT 
REQUIRED DURING THE NON-CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATIVE 
DETENTION 
Below, defendant argued that his statements at the scene should be suppressed 
because they were elicited without benefit of a Miranda warning (R. 58-59, 174). He 
claimed that from the time the officer smelled alcohol on his breath, he was effectively in 
16 
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custody for purposes of the Fifth Amendment (R. 58-59).p On appeal, defendant asserts this 
same claim with a factual modification (Br.Aplt. at 36-40). He now claims that he was in 
custody and effectively under arrest "from the moment Witte felt the pipe" {Br.Aplt at 39). 
The trial court's ruling properly negates both arguments. 
The court found that defendant was not arrested until he failed the field sobriety tests 
(R287: 3). The court concluded that up until the arrest, defendant was detained, but not in 
custody for Fifth Amendment purposes (id.). Defendant knew he was being temporarily 
detain while the trooper investigated the unattached license plate violation and his possible 
impairment. He also must have recognized that field sobriety tests are a routine part of such 
an investigation. Though the officer was armed, he did not draw his weapon or otherwise 
threaten defendant (R294: 15-16). The encounter was low key, including the pat-down, 
which was kept to the most minimal level (R294: 7-9,14-16). See note 7, supra. When the 
trooper discovered the pipe in defendant's pocket, he did not accuse defendant of illegal 
activity, but simply stated, "This is a pipe" (R294: 9, 19). Defendant then volunteered that 
it was a marijuana pipe and that marijuana was in his other pocket (id.; R287: 3). The 
trooper did not remove the items from defendant, but proceeded with the field sobriety tests 
9
 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, requires that a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights be 
explained prior to a custodial interrogation. A suspect is "in custody" for purposes of 
Miranda if his "freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal 
arrest.'" State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah 1996) (quoting Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984). Traffic detentions are generally considered non-
custodial and, therefore, do not implicate Miranda. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 429-30; 
State v. Zepeda, 2003 UT App 298 (unpublished opinion) (attached to Addendum D 
pursuant to rule 30(f), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure). 
17 
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(R294: 9, 24; R287; 4). When defendant failed the tests "miserably," he was arrested and 
handcuffed (R294: 8,23). Nothing in this scenario suggests that defendant was in "custody" 
for Miranda purposes, though he subjectively recognized he was "caught." Compare State 
v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983) (holding that custody did not occur when a 
driver, detained on a public street, performed field sobriety tests); Zepeda, 2003 UT App 
298, \ 2 (analyzing various Berkemer-Mirquet factors and concluding that questioning a 
driver about possible drug usage did not render the traffic stop custodial), with Mirquet, 914 
P.2d at 1147-48 (holding that accusatory questioning of a driver, detained in a police vehicle, 
including ordering the driver to hand over his drugs, constituted custody and required a 
Miranda warning). 
Whether in custody or not, the trial court also found that defendant's statements 
concerning the marijuana, the pipe, and his marijuana usage were volunteered (R287: 3). 
Below, defendant never claimed otherwise, only that his detention was custodial at its 
inception (R. 58-59). See Add. C. Now, for the first time on appeal, defendant argues that 
the presence of the armed officer overcame his free will and made his prz-Miranda 
statements involuntary. Compare Br.Aplt. at 32-33, with i?. 68 & 174. Because this 
challenge is not preserved, its consideration on appeal is waived. 
In sum, the trial court correctly denied the suppression of defendant's pve-Miranda 
statements on the ground that they were volunteered and/or made during non-custodial 
interrogation. 
18 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant raises only unpreserved or non-meritorious issues and, therefore, provides 
no basis to reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. His conviction should 
be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / i ^ d a y of April, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Plaintiff/Appellee were mailed to LORI J. SEPPI, SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER 
ASSOCIATION, attorneys for Defendant/Appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt 
Lake City, UT 84111, this /9 day of April, 2004. 
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant 
shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives 
counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to 
plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer 
with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not 
guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A 
defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty 
by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a 
defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a 
plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent 
of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case 
shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to make 
bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases 
other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for 
a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no 
contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea 
until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or 
she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption 
of innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrirnination, 
the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the 
right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prose-
cution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are 
waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and ele-
ments of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon 
trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of 
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is 
an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis 
is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was 
actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant 
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial 
risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of 
the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense 
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discus-
sion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been 
reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for 
filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of 
appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defen-
dant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting 
these factors after the court has established that the defen-
dant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of 
the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the En-
glish language, it will be sufficient that the statement has 
been read or translated to the defendant 
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Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not 
required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral 
consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for 
filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or 
guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea 
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make 
a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any 
other party has agreed to request or recommend the accep-
tance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of 
other charges, the agreement shall be approved by the court. 
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the 
court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any 
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions 
prior to any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting 
attorney. 
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, 
the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the disclo-
sure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in 
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then 
indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel 
whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should 
not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall 
advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to 
either affirm or withdraw the nlea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the 
prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of 
guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the 
record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of 
the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to with-
draw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally 
ill, in addition to the other requirements of this rule, the court 
shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if 
the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Coda. 
Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
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MOTOR VEHICLES 
PART 4 
LICENSE PLATES AND REGISTRATION INDICIA 
41-la-403. Plates to be legible from 100 feet. 
License plates and the required letters and numerals on 
them, except the decals and the slogan, shall be of sufficient 
size to be plainly readable from a distance of 100 feet during 
daylight. 1992 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due pro-
cess of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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vs. 
TRAVIS BERTOCH, 
Defendant. 
ORIGINAL 
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Third District Court Judge 
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231 East 400 South, Ste 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (8 01)3 63-79 00 
For the Defendant: M. Karlynn Hinman 
722 Shepard Lane, Ste. 104 
Farmington, UT 84025-3845 
Telephone: (801)447-4288 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on September 30, 2002) 
THE COURT: Let's get on the record in the matter of 
Travis Bertoch, 011919305. This is on for motions. The Court 
heard argument last week, took it under advisement again so I 
could renew — or review again all of the memorandums, which I 
have done. 
I think we excused Mr. Bertoch from being here today, 
didn't we? Or is he supposed to be here? 
MS. HINMAN: I believe, unfortunately, you said he 
needed to be here, your Honor, and I tried to reach him, and I 
also spoke with his brother. He did not have this on his 
calendar, and I haven't been able to reach him. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, he was here when I set it, so 
we can issue a warrant— 
MS. HINMAN: Well, he was not here on Friday because 
he had been excused— 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm going to issue a warrant 
in the amount of $5,000, but you can cure that by just telling 
me that you've talked to Mr. Bertoch and you've been in touch 
with him, okay? 
MS. HINMAN: All right, fine. Your Honor, we expect 
to be in West Valley City on a misdemeanor matter tomorrow 
morning, I'm sure, if not before then. I will— 
THE COURT: Okay, I just need to know that he shows up 
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1 for that, okay? 
2 MS. HINMAN: Thank you very much, your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: All right. In regards to the motion, the 
4 Court is going to deny defense's motions for the following 
5 reasons. The first one was suppressing the statements 
6 defendant made after the stop. I'm denying it. The Court's 
7 considering it to be an investigatory stop. It was a DUI stop. 
8 Even though he could smell alcohol — the officer 
9 could smell alcohol — that is not enough in and of itself a 
10 probable cause for an arrest. Mr. Bertoch was not under 
11 arrest. This matter has been heard by Courts many times. The 
12 Court did not consider him under arrest, and the questions 
13 asked by the officer are preliminary investigatory questions 
14 such as, "Have you been drinking," and I think in this 
15 particular case Mr. Bertoch volunteered that he had a couple of 
16 beers, but the Court does not feel that he was in custody, and 
17 therefore Miranda had to be given before the statements could 
18 be admitted. 
19 Also, when the officer found the lump in his pocket 
20 and stated just to Mr. Bertoch that it felt like a pipe, the 
21 defendant responded on his own that it was a pipe, and then he 
22 also volunteered the information that he had marijuana and — 
23 I can't — I think a lighter in his other pocket. He also 
24 volunteered that he had been smoking marijuana. Again, these 
25 were still investigatory questions. 
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The Court finds that the Terry frisk was appropriate 
and legal. Once the officer smelled alcohol and took 
Mr. Bertoch out of the vehicle, he had a right to frisk 
him. 
I went through the prelim, I went through the 
statements of the officer. I didn't find any evidence 
where the officer reached in his pocket and took these things 
out. It was Mr. Bertoch that volunteered that it was a pipe, 
and even though it could have been a pipe of tobacco or 
anything, at that point it didn't make a difference. There 
wasn't evidence about anything. The officer even told 
Mr. Bertoch to keep the matter — the pipe and the other 
material in his pockets until later. 
I think that the initial stop was lawful because 
the license plate was unlawfully displayed, and the Court of 
Appeals and the Supreme Court have both told us that basically 
no matter how minute, if a traffic violation takes place, that 
gives rise to probable cause for the initial stop. 
In regards to the suppression of the pipe and the 
baggie containing a green leafy substance, the Court both 
finds that these were taken at the search incident to arrest. 
Mr. Bertoch was later arrested. At that point, the officer 
asked him to empty his pockets or to take out what was in his 
pockets, and that's when they were brought out. 
In the suppression of the zig-zag papers, the Court 
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1 denies that motion. The Court either feels that one, it was 
2 found during the inventory search of the vehicle after the 
3 arrest was made, or it was found in the search incident to 
4 arrest at the time that Mr. Bertoch was arrested, even though 
5 it was done by a different officer. 
6 Even though — and again, even though the papers 
7 themselves are not illegal, I mean these are questions for 
8 the jury whether they think that zig-zag papers are drug 
9 paraphernalia or not. Based on the other evidence found and 
10 Mr. Bertoch's admitting he smoked marijuana, the Court can 
11 surely believe that it's for the use of marijuana, but I'm not 
12 the fact finder in this particular case. I'm only asked 
13 whether to suppress them or not, so it will be allowed. 
14 Suppressing all the other statements because 
15 Mr. Bertoch did not understand the Miranda warnings, I have 
16 heard no testimony whatsoever in any way that Mr. Bertoch was 
17 incapacitated to a point that he couldn't understand Miranda. 
18 He said that he understood it, and he then proceeded to ask the 
19 questions. I think that burden is on the defense and I don't 
2 0 think they've met that burden. 
21 Suppression of the battery case with the meth. Yes, 
22 there is some confusion as to whether it was a plastic case, a 
23 battery case that contained meth or a clear plastic case — a 
24 white — excuse me, some of it was. It was a white battery 
25 case containing meth. In other reports it was a clear case 
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that contained a white powdery substance. 
One, I don't find those to be that much of a 
discrepancy between what is being described. Two, I think 
that that again is a question for the trier of fact as to 
whether they believe that was the particular battery case 
that was found on Mr. Bertoch or not. 
Also, in regards to the chain, the Court isn't 
necessarily agreeing that it will come in, I'm just not 
suppressing it. If each individual officer can establish 
that that was the piece of evidence that they found and they 
handled, then the chain allows it to come in and then the 
jury gives it what weight they seem to think it deserves. 
Just because there's a misidentification — it's not 
even a misidentification. It's a different description of the 
same piece of evidence. I don't think in and of itself that is 
grounds to suppress the evidence. 
In regards to the stopping — a profile stop because 
Mr. Bertoch had his head shaved and because the officer might 
have thought that he was a straight-edger, I've just heard 
no — there's been nothing to that. 
There was a legitimate traffic violation that took 
place, and the officer stopped him for a legitimate reason. If 
the officer didn't have a traffic violation and yes, he just 
stopped him for no apparent reason whatsoever, then maybe the 
Court would look more seriously at that, but based on what I've 
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1 I heard there's nothing to show that the stop was initially 
2 unlawful and was therefore a profile stop. 
3 So based on that, the Court is going to deny each and 
4 every one of defense's motions. Do you want to set it for 
5 trial? 
6 COURT CLERK: It is set for trial. 
7 I THE COURT: It is set for next week, okay. 
COURT CLERK: No, this week, Wednesday, Thursday and 
9 I Friday. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. So as it stands right now it will 
11 go to trial, depending on where it sits with the other — I 
12 don't — we haven't even seen everybody as to the trials that 
13 are set for Wednesday, so I don't know what place setting it 
14 has. 
15 COURT CLERK: Right now it's No. 2. 
16 THE COURT: Right now it's a No. 2 setting. Okay? 
17 MR. BERTOCH: Okay. 
18 THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
19 (Hearing concluded) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Addendum C 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
\y xj\/ ^ Y ^ 
02/:?,? z? m j : 29 
1 fi fH? v 
SA-_r 
M. Karlynn Hinman (3908) cy_ 
CUMMINGS, BORNEMEIER & HlNMAN, LLP, 
Attorney for Defendant 
722 Shepard Lane, Suite 104 
Farmington, Utah 84025-3845 
Telephone: (801) 451-8400 
Facsimile: (801) 447-4288 
0l 
5*1* 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DIVISION 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRAVIS BERTOCH, 
Defendant. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS, 
FOR ADDITIONAL TIME 
TO PRESENT TRANSCRIPT 
AND FOR OTHER RELIEF 
Case No. Of) 1-919305 
Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs 
Defendant Travis Bertoch submits this Memorandum and the attached and 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Utah Highway Patrol ("UHP") Trooper Christopher C. Witte first observed the 
Defendant Travis Bertoch "EB, SR201 onto 1-15 and then onto I80." {DUI Report 
Section Number: RID1601-0873 signed by Trooper Witte, Exhibit ["Ex."] A,1 see also 
Ex. N., a chronology showing dates and times set forth in the Exhibits.} 
2. "On Wednesday the 19th September 2001, at approximately 2100 hours I was traveling 
eastbound on SR 201. Shortly thereafter I observed a maroon Ford Contour with a 
rear license plate that was lying on the right side of the back window's ledge. I 
followed the vehicle onto southbound SR 15(1-15), then onto eastbound SR 80 (I--80)" 
"at Mile Post No. 124." {Utah Highway Patrol Incident Report for Case Number 16-01-
0873, p. 2, Ex. D, UHP Incident Report2; Ex. B; Information, Ex. C , Counts I -IV.} 
3. Trooper Witte stopped Mr. Bertoch (the "Stop") on Wednesday, September 19, 2001 at 
"MILITARY TIME 2119." {DUI summons and Citations State of Utah Citation No. D 
384861 signed by Trooper Witte, see also Ex. B, Summons; see also Ex. A.} 
4. The Incident Report describes Mr. Bertoch's hair color as "Blonde" and states that he 
had "tattoes [sic: tattoos] oyer both arms." {Ex. A, p. 1; but see Ex. N: Mr. Bertoch's 
brother states that Mr. Travis Bertoch's head was shaved at the time.} 
5. Trooper Witte states "The subject's vehicle rear plate was laid inside the vehicle in the 
rear window. It was not securely fastened to the outside of the vehicle." {Ex. B, 
Section V.} 
6. At the Preliminary Hearing, Trooper Witte admitted he "did not run [the license plate 
number] at that time" of the Stop, before conducting a "Terry frisk" (described below.) 
{Testimony of Trooper Witte at Preliminary Hearing on taped transcript, March 14, 
1
 The DUI Report states "Time Prepared: 0059," approximately one hour after midnight during the morning after 
the initial stop. {Ex. A, p. 1.} 
2
 The Incident Report indicates the Incident Date as "09/19/2001 21:03" and that the report was "Completed 
09/20/2001 00:25." The Incident Report states "This report is accurate:" followed by space for the "Reporting 
Officer's Signature" and is signed "Christopher Witte" with the date "9/20/01 12:25:00 AM." {Ex. D, pp. 1,3.} 
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2002, Transcript by certified court reporter to be appended as Ex. M when 
completed.}3 
7. After making the Stop, "I [Trooper Witte] made contact with the driver, Travis Bertoch, 
and stated the reason for the stop." {Ex. D, p. 2.} 
8. 1 [Trooper Witte] smelled alcohol coming from Mr. Bertoch" {Id., emphasis added.} 
9. The DU1 Report states, "Odor of alcoholic beverage: present on the subject's 
breath." {Ex. A, Section VII.} 
70.The DUI Report states, "Speech: slow Balance: fair Signs or complaints of injury 
or illness: broken right ankle a couple of times Other physical characteristics: red 
blood shot eyes. Subject's tongue was tinted green with blisters on the back of his 
tongue." {Id} 
11.The vehicle was searched at "I-80 @ State Street" at "2129;" "Evidence: zig zag [sic, 
Zig Zag] papers" are found. {Id., Section IX.} 
12.Trooper Witte states: "I asked Mr. Bertoch how much he had to drink. He replied that 
he had had two beers to drink. {Ex. D., p. 2.} 
13. "I [Trooper Witte] removed Mr. Bertoch from the vehicle and conducted a Terry frisk" 
prior to administering the Uniform Field Sobriety Tests." {Id. p. 2, emphasis added.} 
14. While conducting the "Terry frisk" "I felt a hard object in the subject's left front pants 
pocket." {Id., emphasis added} 
15.Trooper Witte testified he had been armed with a Glock .40, a "tool" called an "ASP" 
and a container with a substance he described as "pepper spray" and that Mr. Bertoch 
was not free to leave from the Stop. {Ex. M.}4 
3 The later report on the plate showed Travis Bertoch as the registered owner of the car. Mr. Bertoch's Driver's 
License proved "VALID [,] CLASS D [with] RESTRICTIONS corrective lenses" and no endorsements. {Ex. A.} 
4
 Defendant requests the Court to take notice that a Glock .40 is a semiautomatic handgun. Defendant also 
requests the Court to take notice that, according to an employee at Skaggs Public Safety Uniforms & 
Equipment, 3828 South Main Street, Murray, UT, a well-known supplier of equipment to the law enforcement 
community, the ASP is a telescoping "baton," available in three lengths when extended: 21 inches, 26 inches 
and 31 inches and is thus similarly to the older-styled wooden batons commonly called "night sticks" or "billy 
clubs." Because the baton "telescopes," an officer can carry it in its short or telescoped mode more easily than 
the wooden batons that were long the standard issue to police officers. Trooper Witte adamantly refused to 
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16.1 told Mr. Bertoch that the object was a pipe." {Id., emphasis added} 
17. "He [Mr. Bertoch] informed me that it was. He also stated that he had lighters and 
marijuana in his right front pants pocket. {Id., emphasis added.} 
18."\ told Mr. Bertoch leave the items in his pockets." {Id.} 
19. "When i [Trooper Witte] removed the subject from the vehicle to administer the FST's 
[field sobriety tests] I conducted a Terry frisk on the subject. I touched his left front 
pants pocket and felt a hard object. I informed him that is a pipe. He stated that it 
was. Also, I continued to search the subject for the pipe and found in this [sic: his] 
front right pants pocket a small clear plastic sandwich baggie containing a green leafy 
substance" (the "Baggie") {Ex. A p. 2, emphasis added.} 
20. "I [Trooper Witte] took Mr. Bertoch into custody without incident at 2119 hours." {Id.} 
21. "While conducting the vehicle inventory and impound, Trooper Hopkins [backup at the 
Stop] found a pack of "Zig-Zag" rolling paper. I [Trooper Witte] secured this in my 
vehicle also. {Ex. A, p. 2.} 
22. In the Vehicle Impound Report signed by Trooper Hopkins, the "Property in vehicle" 
was "misc papers, 60 CD's, [crossed out word], cigarettes, Zig Zag, glasses." {Vehicle 
Impound Report No. A 959555, Ex. E.} 
23.The Vehicle Impound Report notes, in the category "Visible damage:" "No trunk lid -
rear end damage Rh [?] door." {Id.} 
24. None of the reports signed by or attributed to Trooper Witte refer to "No trunk lid..." 
{See Exs. A, B, D and other Exhibits cited below.} 
25. At the Preliminary Hearing, Trooper Witte testified, in substance, that he noticed that 
Mr. Bertoch's vehicle did not have a trunk lid and testified that was a "suspicion." {See 
Ex. D, p. 1; Ex. M) 
describe the ASP as a "club" but called it a tool, but a telescoping baton can easily be used as a "tool" in the 
same manner that earlier police officers would have used a night stock or a billy club. Trooper Witte was clearly 
well armed in accordance with current law enforcement practice. Mr. Bertoch was not armed. Trooper Witte was 
controlling Mr. Bertoch from the moment he "removed" Mr. Bertoch from Mr. Bertoch's car. {See Ex. D.) 
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26. After making the search, Trooper Witte conducted the sobriety tests and describes his 
conclusions: " 1 . HGN [Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus5] 4/6 clues. Lack of smooth pursuit 
in both eyes. Distinct nystagmus at maximum deviation in both eyes. 2. OLS [One 
Leg Stand] 2 clues. Stated his right ankle had been broken a couple of times. 1-10 
seconds he swayed. 11-20 he raised his arms for balance more than 6 inches from 
his side. 3. WAT [Walk and Turn]: 3 clues. Could not keep his balance twice by 
stepping off the line during the instructional phase. During the first 9 steps the subject 
raised his arms once and performed an improper turn by pivoting on both feet. Raised 
his arms during the second 9 steps more than 6 inches from his side. 4. PBT present 
for alcohol." {Ex. A, VII.} 
27.Trooper Witte found "Subjects [sic: Subject's] ability to follow instructions poor." 
{Id.} 
28.Trooper Witte asserts that, he "(read at 2130 hours)" the statement: "Mr. BERTOCH, 
do you understand that you are under arrest for: Driving under the influence of 
alcohol and/or drugs or with a measurable amount of a controlled substance or 
metabolite in your body? (41-6-44, 44-6-44.6 UCA . . ,?" He states the "Response if 
any:" that "subject stated confusion." {Id.} 
29.Trooper Witte states he asked, "What is your response to my request that you 
submit to a chemical test?" and Mr. Bertoch said, "I guess they can come take my 
blood." {Id., see also the one-paged description of tests that may have been 
appended to Ex. A, attached as Ex. F.} 
30. After the arrest, search and tests "I [Officer Witte] transported Mr. Bertoch to the 
Chevron gas station on the corner of 2100 South and State Street. We met with Patti 
Wayman, who took a blood sample from Mr. Bertoch at 2205 hours...." {Ex. A, Ex. D, 
p. 2.} 
5
 Webster's New World Dictionary, 2d College Ed., Simon & Schuster © 1982 p. 979, defines "nystagmus" as "n. 
[ModL. <Gr, nystagmos, drowsiness < nystazein, to be sleepy < IE. Base *sneud-, to sleep] an involuntary, rapid 
movement of the eyeball, usually from side to side." 
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31Then, "I [Trooper Witte] transported Mr. Bertoch [t]o the Salt Lake County Jail to be 
booked on his charges. I read Mr. Bertoch his Miranda rights at 2226 hours, and he 
agreed to speak with me (see attached D.U.I, report). Deputy Brandon Peterson (J-
33) of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office processed Mr. Bertoch. While searching 
Mr. Bertoch, Deputy Peterson (J-33) discovered a small white plastic battery container, 
containing a white powdery substance. Mr. Bertoch stated that this was 'meth.'" {Id.} 
32. "I [Trooper Witte] secured the white plastic battery container with it's [sic: its] contents 
in my right front pants pocket. I booked Mr. Bertoch on the charges of Improper 
display of License Plates, Driving Under the Influence (drugs), Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, Possession of Marijuana, and Possession of Controlled Substance. I 
secured the pipe with burned residue and the "Zig-Zag" rolling paper in evidence 
locker # 952 at 0019 hours at the section 16 office. I requested scientific analysis on 
the white powder contents of the white plastic battery case. I also secured the white 
plastic battery case in evidence locker #588 at 0025 hours at the Section 16 office. 
{W-, P. 2.}6 
33.The Incident Report states the "Reason for Stop" was "Traffic," the "Description of 
Stop" was Improper display of rear license plate" and lists "Drugs Seized" "1 Grams 
Manufactured Compartment" on each of two lines; "Other Place of Concealment" was 
"pants pockets" and "Other Markings none." "Paraphernalia Seized: 1-glass pipe with 
burned residue, 1-pack of 'Zig-Zag'" rolling papers." On the last line of the form under 
"Subj No & Name" the typed entry is "1 Bertoch, Travis" but the "Offense" states 
"Receiving Stolen Property." {Id. p. 4, SUPPLEMENTAL FACT SHEET.}7 
6
 The Court is requested to take notice that the Salt Lake County Jail is located at 3415 South 900 West, West 
Valley City, UT 84119 and UHP "Section 16" has an "Office Address" at 1842 West 2770 South, Suite 10, West 
Valley City, UT 84119." {Ex. D, p. 1.} The two addresses are approximately 2 1/8 miles apart. 
7
 The statement "Receiving Stolen Property" on p. 4 of Ex. D is prejudicially outside the context of this case 
since p. 1 of Ex. D reports the identifies Mr. Bertoch as the "Registered Owner." Neither the Information {Ex. C} 
nor any other document produced for discovery alleges anything was stolen or that Mr. Bertoch received stolen 
property. Consequently, this irrelevancy should be stricken. 
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34. Trooper Witte states "Arrest and baker at 2119 hours. Miranda at 2226 hours." {Id. p. 
3-} 
35. "I [Trooper Witte] served notice on subject Time served: by me to his left front 
pants pocket @ 2232 hours at the jail." {Id. p. 4.} 
36. The DUI report states that Trooper Witte's signature was typed at his direction on 
"Date: 9/20/01 Time: 0110." {Id. p. 4.} 
37. A UHP "SECTION 16 'SPECIAL OPERATIONS EVIDENCE AND PROPERTY REPORT" form 
referring to Locker Number 592 lists three items, "1 glass pipe with burned residue 2 
small clear baggy with green leafy substance 3 "Zig-Zag" rolling papers" with a "CHAIN 
OF POSSESSION: From Suspect To Troopers vehicle Date: 09/19/01 Time: @ 2119" and 
"From: Troopers' Vehicle To: locker #592 Date 09/20/01 Time: @0019." {Ex. G.} 
38. A second UHP "SECTION 16 'SPECIAL OPERATIONS'" form referring to Locker Number 
588 lists "1 small, clear, plastic battery case containing a white powdery substance" 
with a "CHAIN OF POSSESSION: From Subject To: Deputy B. Peterson J-33 Date: 
09/19/01 Time: @ 2245 From: Deputy B. Peterson J-33 To: Trpr C. Witte 431 Date: 
09/19/01 Time: @ 2245 From Trp Witte 431 To: locker # 588 Date: 09/20/01 Time: @ 
0025 From Locker to Crime Lab Date: 9/20/01 Time: @ 1000." {Ex. H, emphasis 
added.} 
39.The Preliminary Toxicology Report dated "10/05/2001" indicates Mr. Bertoch's blood 
alcohol level was "0.01 "and that drug screening test results were "Marijuana or 
metabolite Blood NEG." {Ex. I ["eye"].} Driving with a blood-alcohol level of.08 grams 
or more is illegal in Utah. U.C.A. 41-6-44 (2) (a) (i). 
40.The Probable Cause Statement appended to the Information states: "Your affiant 
bases probable cause on the following: The statement of Utah Highway Patrol 
Trooper Witte that on September 19, 2001, he observed the defendant, Travis 
Bertoch, operating a vehicle at I-80 and State Street in Salt Lake County. Trooper 
Witte observed that the rear license plate was not securely fastened to the outside of 
the vehicle and was lying in the rear window. Trooper Witte initiated a traffic stop and 
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observed the defendant behind the wheel. Trooper Witte detected and odor of alcohol 
on the defendant's breath. The defendant had slow speech and bloodshot eyes. The 
defendant admitted that he had consumed two beers and smoked marijuana. The 
defendant failed the field sobriety tests. A blood test indicated a blood/alcohol level of 
.01. Trooper Witte performed a Terry frisk and located a pipe in the defendant's right 
front pants pocket. Trooper Witte also located a plastic baggie containing a green 
leafy substance. The defendant admitted that the substance was marijuana. Upon 
searching the defendant's vehicle, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Hopkins located a 
pack of zigzag rolling papers. As the defendant was booked into jail, Jail Staff located 
a plastic container with a white powdery substance. The defendant admitted that the 
substance was methamphetamine. The substance was sent to the Utah State crime 
Lab where methamphetamine was identified in the in the plastic container." {Ex. C, 
emphasis added.) 
41. In the "Salt Lake County No Warrant Arrest Fact Sheet," with a "PRINT DATE: 09/19/01 
TIME: 23:12," Trooper Witte states, in relevant part: "I OBSERVED THE SUBJECT TRAVELING 
EAST ON I-80 FROM 1-1 5. THE SUBJECT'S VEHICLE HAD THE REAR LICENSE PLATE DISPLAYED 
IN THE REAR WINDOW. I STOPPED THE SUBJECT ON EB I-80 JUST PRIOR TO THE STATE STREET 
OFF RAMP. I MADE CONTACT WITH THE SUBJECT AND DETECTED THE ODOR OF AN ALCOHOLIC 
BEVERAGE FROM THE SUBJECT. I ASKED THE SUBJECT HOW MUCH HE HAD TO DRINK, AND HE 
REPLIED THAT HE HAD HAD 2 BEERS. I REMEOVED THE SUBJECT FROM HIS VEHICLE TO 
PERFORM UFST'S. PRIOR TO THE TEST, I CONDUCTED A "TERRY FRISK". THIS REVEALED A 
GLASS PIPE WITH BURNED RESIDUE IN HIS LEFT FRONT PANTS POCKET, AND A SMALL BAGGY OF 
A GREEN LEAFY SUBSTANCE IN THE RIGHT FRONT PANTS POCKET. I ASKED THE SUBJECT WHEN 
HE HAD SMOKED MARIJUANA LAST. SUBJECT STATED THAT HE HAD SMOKED IT THE NIGHT 
BEFORE AT ABOUT 7 O'CLOCK. I ADMINISTERED THE UFST'S, WHICH THE SUBJECT FAILED. 
THE SUBJECTS [SIC, SUBJECT'S]TOUNGE [SIC: TONGUE] WAS TINTED GREEN AND HAD 
BLISTERS ON THE BACK OF THE TOUNGE [SIC: TONGUE]. I ARRESTED THE SUBJECT FOR DUI 
AND POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA AND PARAPHERNALIA. ... I TRANSPORTED THE SUBJECT TO 
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THE CHEVRON AT 2100 SOUTH AND STATE STREET, WHERE A BLOOD SAMPLE WAS TAKEN 
FROM THE SUBJECT. I THEN TRANSPORTED THE SUBJECT TO THE SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL FOR 
BOOKING. WHILE DEPUTY BRANDON PETERSON WAS SEARCHING THE SUBJECT AT 
APPROXIMATELY 2245 HOURS, HE DISCOVERED A SMALL WHITE BATTERY CASE CONTAINING A 
WHITE POWEDER. WHEN ASKED BY DEPUTY PETERSON, THE SUBJECT STATED THAT THE 
SUBSTANCE WAS 'METH'. I AMENDED THE CHARGES ON THE SUBJECT."{Salt Lake County 
No Warrant Arrest Fact Sheet, Ex. J, emphasis added.) 
42. The Witness and Evidence list refers to the white powder as "evidence" to be 
produced. {Ex. N.} 
43. At the Preliminary Hearing, a toxicology report allegedly identifying the white powder 
as methamphetamine was admitted without objection by Defendant's previous 
attorney. No copy of the report has been produced as of the date of this 
Memorandum, although a copy is being requested and will be submitted as Ex. P if or 
when received. 
44. Mr. Bertoch had shaved his head and was not blonde at the time of the incident and 
had a painful crushed toe that affected his walking. {Ex. L} 
ARGUMENT 
STATEMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY 
MR. BERTOCH AT THE PLACE OF THE STOP 
MUST BE SUPPRESSED. 
Trooper Witte followed Mr. Bertoch from State Road 201 near Redwood Road, onto I-
15 from State Road 201 and then onto I-80, before stopping Mr. Bertoch at Mile Marker 124, 
approximately 500 feet west of the State Street exit off I-80. The Court is requested to take 
notice that the distance from Redwood Road (approximately 1700 West) to the location of the 
Stop is approximately 2 miles. Since Trooper Witte saw the Bertoch car at least by 2103 but 
did not stop Mr. Bertoch until 2119, Trooper Witte had approximately 16 minutes to observe a 
car traveling about 2 miles, which would suggest that the overall speed was less than 10 
miles per hour through the State Road, freeway entrances and freeway distances, a speed 
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that would have given Trooper Witte ample time to observe the car and driver he followed. 
Trooper Witte wrote in his reports and testified that he observed that the license plate on Mr. 
Bertoch's car was not properly displayed, a factor he apparently was able to observe as soon 
as he observed the rear end of the car, especially since Trooper Witte testified at the 
Preliminary Hearing that the absence of a trunk lid was a "suspicion." Strangely, he never 
mentioned his "suspicion" in any of the reports he prepared the night of and after the arrest. 
Only Trooper Hopkins, who searched the car, felt the absence of the trunk lid important 
enough to record - but was preparing an impound report. 
Driving with an improperly displayed license plate is a Class C Misdemeanor, 
ordinarily handled by the issuance of a summons and citation. Yet Trooper Witte stated he 
"removed" Mr. Bertoch from his car when Trooper Witte made the Stop. Trooper Witte 
testified that Mr. Bertoch was not free to leave the location of the Stop. 
Trooper Witte was armed with a handgun, a "tool" [apparently a telescoping baton] and 
pepper spray.8 Trooper Witte found Mr. Bertoch to be "slow" and taken into custody without 
incident. Mr. Bertoch was clearly under the control of a law enforcement officer from the time 
the Stop was initiated at 2119. In addition, Trooper Witte had "backup" from Trooper 
Hopkins, who was at the site of the Stop at least by 2129 when he conducted a search of Mr. 
Bertoch's car.9 
The testimony and written reports from Trooper Witte show Mr. Bertoch became a 
suspect and a target of investigation for unlawful activity by 2103 when Trooper Witte first 
observed him going eastbound on State Road 201, near Redwood Road. Nonetheless, 
Trooper Witte did not give Mr. Bertoch a Miranda warning or ask Mr. Bertoch if he understood 
his rights under Miranda but still wanted to speak to the Trooper until 2226, at least 107 
minutes after the actual Stop. The statements attributed to Mr. Bertoch during that entire 
period, prior to the receipt of Miranda warnings but when he was in custody and under the 
8
 The Court is requested to take notice that a "slow" person (as Trooper Witte says he found Mr. Bertoch) who 
has been "removed" from his car by a well-armed Trooper would be ill advised to try to leave the Stop. 
9
 Trooper Witte's testimony indicates that he did not need the assistance of Trooper Hopkins to make the arrest 
but was, by himself, able to control Mr. Bertoch, making Trooper Hopkins free to search the car. 
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control of Trooper Witte, must therefore be suppressed. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966).10 These alleged statements, according to Trooper Witte, include his alleged 
statements about having drunk beers, having smoked marijuana, having marijuana and 
lighters in his pocket and allegedly agreeing the tube Trooper Witte felt in Mr. Bertoch's left 
pocket (but continued to search for in Mr. Bertoch's right pocket) was the kind of pipe Trooper 
Witte said it was. Trooper Witte had an unarmed man who was driving a car without a trunk 
lid but with a license plate Trooper Witte chose not to "run" when Trooper Witte arrested him. 
THE PARAPHERNALIA (PIPE) AND 
THE "BAGGIE" OF GREEN LEAFY SUBSTANCE 
MUST BE SUPPRESSED 
Trooper Witte reports in writing and testified at the Preliminary Hearing that Mr. 
Bertoch told him, among the statements that must be suppressed under Miranda, that he had 
marijuana and a lighter in his right hand pocket - after Trooper Witte alleges that he was able 
to feel a tube or pipe through Mr. Bertoch's trousers during the course of the Terry frisk. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) permits a police officer to perform a pat down to be 
sure a suspect is not armed - this has become, in the argot of Utah law enforcement - a 
search performed for "officer's safety." Trooper Witte testified at the Preliminary Hearing that 
he initiated the "frisk" because of "officer's safety," then later testified on cross examination 
that he had been "rear-ended" twice when he had previously made stops of other vehicles in 
the course of his service with the UHP since his appointment in 1997.11 
The importance and application of Miranda are so well known that no further citation is required. The only 
possible exception to the suppression of statements during the pre-Miranda conversation might, arguendo, be 
Mr. Bertoch's statement, in substance, allowing a blood sample to be taken because of the implied consent 
doctrines that allegedly attach to the driving privilege. Since the Lab Report was negative for marijuana and 
metabolites and since the blood alcohol reading was .01 (some .07 below the statutory impairment quantity), the 
consent to the blood test is exculpatory. Cases following and distinguishing Miranda are, we submit, inapposite 
to the specific factual situation in this case - as reported by the arresting Trooper. Both the United States 
Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment application of the Fifth Amendment to the States and the Utah Constitution 
protections against self-incrimination apply to Mr. Bertoch at the Stop. 
Although searching for weapons in a pat-down or frisk under Terry is understandable, Trooper Witte's 
testimony that he had been "rear-ended" twice during stops has nothing to do with patting down a person who 
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in the course of the pat down, Trooper Witte says he was able to feel a "pipe" through 
Mr. Bertoch's pants pocket- on the left-hand side. Trooper Witte then, allegedly, continues 
his search because he was looking for the pipe. He states: 
When I removed the subject from the vehicle to administer the FST's I conducted a 
Terry frisk on the subject. I touched his left front pants pocket and felt a hard object I 
informed him that is a pipe. [Alleged statement of Mr. Bertoch suppressed under 
Miranda] Also, I continued to search the subject for the pipe and found in this [sic: his] 
right pants pocket a small clear plastic sandwich baggie containing a green leafy 
substance. 
The Court should notice that a "small clear plastic sandwich baggie containing a green 
leafy substance" would not feel like a weapon. The Court should also notice that Trooper 
Witte's search of Mr. Bertoch's right pants pocket involved a sufficient amount of touching 
and feeling to locate, and apparently to withdraw, the small baggie.12 
After feeling a hard object in Mr. Bertoch's left from pants pocket that Trooper Witte 
identified as a "pipe," Trooper Witte had no need to continue to search Mr. Bertoch "for the 
pipe ...in [the] right pants pocket."13 The Court can, and should, infer that Trooper Witte was 
trying to bootstrap from a simple Terry frisk to search for a "weapon" when the Trooper 
himself identified a pipe - clearly not a weapon - and informed Mr. Bertoch what was in his 
pocket Bootstrapping to justify searching for something as small as a baggie in a separate 
pocket located on Mr. Bertoch's right side is simply prohibited. The attempt to bootstrap 
beyond the scope of a Terry frisk. 
But Officer Witte even goes further- besides telling Mr. Bertoch what is in Mr. 
Bertoch's pockets, Officer Witte has stated, in writing, that his search from the hard item in 
has been "removed" by the Trooper from the person's car and who is under the control of the Trooper. Trooper 
Witte has offered no report or testimony of conditions that would indicate that Mr. Bertoch was in any position to 
cause a "rear-ending" to the detriment of Trooper Witte's safety at the Stop. The removal and frisk may have 
exposed Mr. Bertoch to the same potential exposure to being hit by an on-coming vehicle. 
12
 Since no personal property report has been produced in discovery, we do not now know whether Trooper 
Witte found lighters allegedly described by Mr. Bertoch or whether the remark (which must be suppressed if in 
fact made) was verified by the Trooper's search and subsequent removal of the baggy from Mr. Bertoch's right 
pocket. The report may be potentially exculpatory. 
13
 Trooper Witte could only continue the pat down to search for weapons, as more fully discussed infra. 
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the left pocket "REVEALED A GLASS PIPE WITH BURNED RESIDUE IN HIS LEFT FRONT PANTS POCKET, 
AND A SMALL BAGGY OF A GREEN LEAFY SUBSTANCE IN THE RIGHT FRONT PANTS POCKET." 
A Terry frisk, through the clothing of a person under the control of a law enforcement 
officer, could not "reveal" that a pipe inside the pocket contains residue. A Terry frisk 
conducted through clothing could not reveal whether a pipe was made from glass or some 
other hard substance - ceramic or porcelain, for example. 
At the Preliminary Hearing, Trooper Witte admitted he could not have determined 
whether the pipe contained or had any residue while the pipe was in the pocket, although he 
could determine that the item was not a weapon. Because Trooper Witte said (in reports 
prepared within two or three hours of the actual frisk at the Stop) that the Terry frisk 
"REVEALED A GLASS PIPE WITH BURNED RESIDUE IN HIS LEFT FRONT PANTS POCKET,"{Emphasis 
added } The Trooper's statement should be viewed as an admission that he eventually 
removed the non-weapon to determine that it was made from glass rather than from some 
other hard material, that he removed it so he could see that it contained residue - when the 
only legitimate purpose of the frisk was to seek weapons to preserve personal safety. 
And, when the Trooper told the "suspect" that what he felt in the left pocket was a pipe, 
Trooper Witte admitted in his testimony that the pipe could have been a pipe for tobacco -
which is not "paraphernalia" and which is perfectly legal to carry. 
Officer Witte could not claim that he had a "plain view" of the pipe through Mr. 
Bertoch's pocket and could not determine whether the "pipe" was a tobacco pipe or a 
marijuana pipe through the pocket, glass or ceramic, used or unused - and thus could not, 
without removing the pipe, reach any conclusions about the purpose or past use of the pipe. 
Officer Witte did not think the pipe and the baggy were weapons because he told Mr. Bertoch 
to keep the items in his pocket for some period of time after having felt around Mr. Bertoch's 
two pockets while patting down for "officer's safety" then moving his search from the left 
pocket where he felt the pipe and then moving the search to the right pocket to continue the 
search for something that had already been found. Trooper Witte could not assure himself 
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that the pipe was contraband or that it had evidence of having been used with a product 
deemed illegal or deemed to be a controlled substance. 
Trooper Witte cannot convert the weapons pat down to an opportunity to get a "plain 
view" of the contents of Mr. Bertoch's pocket. Even if Officer Witte could have seen the pipe 
and the baggy by peering into a pocket that had a hole in it or looking into a pocket that was 
gapping open at the top, Trooper Witte could not improve his view. The "plain view" doctrine 
discussed in Arizona is inapposite to this facts asserted by Trooper Witte. The contents of Mr. 
Bertoch's pockets were not in plain view. Touching a tube that is a pipe not obviously 
contraband (as Trooper Witte admitted) does not justify seizure. "If the protective search 
goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid 
under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed," Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373, 
citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968). 
The minute Trooper Witte identified the tube in the left pocket as a "pipe," that could 
have been used for tobacco and that Trooper Witte could not determine whether it had been 
used or not without removing the item - and advised Mr. Bertoch to leave the item in his 
pocket because Trooper Witte knew the item was not a weapon, any claim or argument to 
justify removal and seizure of the "pipe" was extinguished and the search exceeded the 
weapons search permitted under the Terry frisk - the very case Trooper Witte used in his 
reports to describe what he was doing at the Stop. 
Identifying the pipe in the left pocket does not justify removal of the baggy from the 
right pocket because a baggy carrying green leafy substances is not a weapon, as Trooper 
Witte clearly admits by telling Mr. Bertoch to leave it in his pocket until some point after 
Trooper Witte allegedly found it - and he would not have been justified in looking at it once 
he knew the right pocket did not contain a weapon. Trooper Witte was not justified in 
extending the search under Terry and could not rely upon his questions to Mr. Bertoch asked 
before Mr. Bertoch had been provided with Miranda warnings. 
In one case reviewed by the United States Supreme Court, a police officer observed a 
piece of stereo equipment in his plain view. The officer turned the equipment around so he 
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could read serial numbers on the back - serial numbers that indicated the equipment was 
stolen property. The seizure of the equipment was suppressed because the officer could not, 
even having had a proper initial "plain view" enhance his plain view by turning the item 
around. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987). 
THE ZIG ZAG ROLLING PAPERS 
AND THEIR SEIZURE SHOULD 
ALSO BE SUPPRESSED 
The Zig Zag rolling papers, listed as physical evidence, should be suppressed both on 
the record produced by the Plaintiff and Trooper Witte and on the legality of owning and 
transporting "rolling papers." Although it is possible (but no one has offered any evidence) 
that the Zig Zags were in "plain view" once Trooper Hopkins began to search Mr. Bertoch's 
car, the search at the Stop was not part of an inventory after an impoundment and clearly 
was not part of a search for weapons to protect the officers' safety. Trooper Hopkins did not 
search the car until after Trooper Witte had "removed" Mr. Bertoch from the car and had been 
out of the car for at least ten minutes. Mr. Bertoch had no passengers in the car. He was 
outside the car, had no weapons and was under Trooper Witte's control as an arrested 
person at 2019. Trooper Witte described him as "slow" and unable to pass the sobriety tests 
- in fact, Trooper Witte testified that he "failed miserably" at the Preliminary Hearing. 
Trooper Hopkins found miscellaneous papers, 60 CDs, cigarettes and the Zig Zags in 
the car and listed those items in documenting the impoundment of the car by Cartow. That 
document suggests the Zig Zags were left in the car. Since the Zig Zag papers are not illegal 
and do not constitute contraband in and of themselves and since they are small, not weapons 
and not harmful, they should not be construed as evidence against Mr. Bertoch. 
Even if the Zig Zags were removed from the car, they prove nothing as "evidence." 
Because Trooper Hopkins found cigarettes during his search of the car, one could infer that 
Mr. Bertoch uses tobacco - and tobacco users can and do use "rolling papers" if they want to 
roll their own cigarettes, even though Trooper Hopkins did not find any loose tobacco in the 
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car.14 Possessing Zig Zags means nothing when the possessor smokes.15 And, strangely 
enough, Trooper Witte claims to have taken possession of the Zig Zags at 2019, ten minutes 
before Trooper Hopkins found them in his search at 2029. The purpose and the chain of 
custody of the Zig Zags are so inherently lacking in probity and credibility that they should be 
suppressed on the facts produced in discovery. 
THE TERRY SEARCH WAS 
IMPROPERLY EXPANDED; 
ITS FRUITS MUST BE SUPPRESSED. 
As stated, Trooper Witte admits he himself identified a "pipe," not a weapon, in Mr. 
Bertoch's left pocket then searched further for the "pipe" by going to the right pocket where 
he extracted the baggie -not a weapon. Trooper Witte even told Mr. Bertoch to keep the pipe 
and the baggie in his pocket while Trooper Witte concerned himself with sobriety tests. 
Trooper Witte's written statements, prepared immediately after the arrest and transport 
of Mr. Bertoch to the Salt Lake County Jail, raise the question whether an officer who 
conducts a Terry frisk and feels a "lump" in a person's pocket can constitutionally seize the 
lump as "contraband" under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The United States Supreme 
Court says no. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993)(White, J.). In Dickerson, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the Minnesota Supreme Court, which suppressed the "lump" 
Even though the Troopers did not find loose tobacco in the car or on Mr. Bertoch's person, no one can 
conclude that the Zig Zags were used to smoke illegal products. Mr. Bertoch can carry papers in his car so he 
has them available when he chooses to use loose tobacco or loose legal herbal compounds. He might have run 
out of loose tobacco - since the marijuana must be suppressed, as argued above, the Zig Zags are useless as 
evidence of a crime. Trooper Witte's report that Mr. Bertoch said he had marijuana and lighters in his right 
pocket, which must be suppressed under Miranda, does not explain what happened during the search - Trooper 
Witte does not at any point claim to have found lighters - no produced property inventory indicates that lighters 
were present. One can ask whether Mr. Bertoch actually made the alleged statement - which must, of course 
be suppressed under the "facts" alleged by Trooper Witte. 
15
 The Court is requested to notice that legal, herbal substitutes for tobacco that do not contain marijuana in any 
form or under any other name, are available to those who want to smoke legally but do not want to use tobacco. 
For example, Jeanie's Smoke Shop, 156 South State, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 carries an herbal cigarette 
(with no tobacco) and an herbal non-tobacco product that substitutes for chewing tobacco and believes other 
companies have a broader range of non-tobacco products. Both the pipe and the Zig Zags can be used for 
such products as well as for tobacco. 
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removed from Dickerson's pocket. Officers had stopped Dickerson and frisked him for 
weapons under Terry. Dickerson did not complain against the frisk for weapons. He moved 
to suppress the "lump" seized from his pocket (which proved to be cocaine), and the 
Minnesota Supreme Court suppressed. The United States Supreme Court rejected much of 
the Minnesota court's reasoning, but affirmed and adopted its own standards, examining an 
attempted analogy to the "plain view" doctrine, and also stating: 
Under [the plain view doctrine from Michigan v. Long, citation omitted], if police are 
lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is 
immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, 
they may seize it without a warrant. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128,136-137 
(1990); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983) {plurality opinion). If, however, the 
police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without 
conducting some further search of the object - i.e., if "its incriminating character [is 
not] Immediately apparent,' Horton, supra, at 136 - the plain view doctrine cannot 
justify its seizure. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987). 
* * * 
The very premise of Terry, after all, is that officers will be able to detect the presence 
of weapons through the sense of touch, and Terry upheld precisely such a seizure. 
Even if it were true that the sense of touch is generally less reliable than the sense of 
sight, that only suggests that officers will less often be able to justify seizures of 
unseen contraband. . . . Where, as here, "an officer who is executing a valid search 
of one item seizes a different item," this Court rightly "has been sensitive to the danger 
. . . that officers will enlarge a specific authorization, furnished by a warrant or 
exigency, into the equivalent of a general warrant to rummage and seize at will." 
[Citation omitted.] Here, the officer's continued exploration of respondent's 
[Dickerson's] pocket after having concluded that it contained no weapon was unrelated 
to "[t]he sole justification of the search [under Terry:]... the protection of the police 
officer and others nearby." [Citation omitted] It therefore amounted to the sort of 
evidentiary search that Terry expressly refused to authorize . . . and that we have 
condemned in subsequent cases. 
Dickerson, supra, 508 U.S. at 373, 377, 378. A typescript Internet copy of Dickerson is 
attached for the convenience of the Court as Ex. L. 
Applying Dickerson to this case, then, Trooper Witte could conduct a Terry frisk to 
determine whether Mr. Bertoch was carrying a weapon but could not seize an item that was 
not a weapon (and that could have been a lawful tobacco pipe), then continue to search for 
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the pipe located in the left pocket by searching the right pocket and seizing a "small baggie" -
which was clearly not a weapon and constituted no threat to Trooper Witte's safety or the 
safety of anyone else. 
Thus, under the facts described by Trooper Witte - with Trooper Witte moving his 
search from left to right because he found something he told Mr. Bertoch was a "pipe," then 
removing a small baggie containing a "green leafy substance" - the paraphernalia and the 
baggie that reportedly contained marijuana, must be suppressed under Dickerson. With the 
suppression of the pipe and the baggie, Counts II and III must be dismissed - but for the 
ambiguous finding of the Zig Zags -which should also be suppressed, as argued above. 
POST-MIRANDA STATEMENTS 
ALLEGEDLY MADE MUST BE 
SUPPRESSED ON THE FACTS 
ASSERTED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT. 
Mr. Bertoch, Slow and Confused, Made No Knowing Waiver of Miranda Rights. 
Trooper Witte followed Mr. Bertoch to observe his driving pattern but had nothing to criticize 
in his written reports except the improper display of the license plate and, in his later 
testimony, the absence of the trunk lid. Trooper Witte said Mr. Bertoch could not perform 
field sobriety tests. Trooper Witte elicited statements from Mr. Bertoch (which, as argued 
above, must be suppressed), which Mr. Bertoch gave with forthcoming candor but without 
appreciation of the potential adverse effects of his cooperation. 
Mr. Bertoch was revealed as a user of tobacco and (as must be suppressed) some 
marijuana. Trooper Witte describes him as having "slow" speech and only "fair" balance. 
Trooper Witte remembers Mr. Bertoch said he had broken ankles "a couple" of times but did 
not note that Mr. Bertoch was suffering from a crushed toe. Trooper Witte reported that Mr. 
Bertoch (who must wear corrective lenses when driving) had bloodshot eyes, a green tongue 
and blisters on the back of his tongue. Officer Witte's report of the sobriety tests indicates 
that both Mr. Bertoch's eyes lacked "smooth pursuit" and that he had distinct nystagmus, 
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apparently meaning that his eyes had involuntary, rapid movements.16 Trooper Witte states 
that Mr. Bertoch swayed and needed his arms for balance (at distances greater than 6 inches 
from his side), improperly pivoted on both feet and twice suffered from imbalance. While the 
lab results show that Trooper Witte erroneously attributed these "clues" as indicating 
excessive alcohol or to marijuana allegedly smoked about 26 hours before the Stop. The 
chemical tests disproved the presence of both alcohol and marijuana/metabolites. 
Although Trooper Witte apparently did not have an immediate report on the blood test 
during on September 19, he could have looked at what he did in fact have before him, 
especially when wrote that Mr. Bertoch stated he had confusion when he allegedly heard a 
question about being arrested for alcohol or drugs. 
Trooper Witte was controlling a man who had a driver license record with no 
allegations of driving under influence, was slow of speech, confused by an arrest statement, 
uncertain of his physical balance, uncertain how to respond to the directions for the steps in a 
sobriety test requiring careful attention to instructions, forthcoming and cooperative, patient 
with and non-resistant to arrest and to the inherent indignity of standing at a gas station at an 
extremely busy intersection while a technician took blood from his arm, very likely worried 
about being arrested and about the impoundment of his car and undoubtedly tired after 
working at a scaffolding company, cleaning a room at his house and putting the dishes away, 
being stopped after having been followed by a UHP Trooper for approximately 16 to 19 
minutes then being searched, tested for sobriety, being booked into Jail, undergoing an 
additional search and then being told he had legal rights. This man, found slow of speech 
and confused about chemical testing, allegedly agreed to continue talking to law enforcement 
officers after he heard a warning 107 minutes after Trooper Witte stopped him and more than 
two hours after the Trooper started following him. And, according to Trooper Witte had 
blisters on the back of his tongue - which suggest a painful mouth - and, according to his 
brother, a painful crushed toe that adversely affected his walking. 
16
 Those eye problems may explain part of Mr. Bertoch's need to wear corrective lenses. Since the Court was 
able to see Mr. Bertoch at the Preliminary Hearing, the Court should notice that Mr. Bertoch was wearing 
glasses (not contact lenses) with some thickness. 
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Mr. Bertoch was not, at that time, a person fully capable to enforce his Miranda rights 
- any statements attributed to him should be suppressed. At minimum, Miranda rights 
cannot and should not be easily forgotten when a person faces the stress of arrest and 
processing.17 
THE USE OF THE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED 
"METH" 
VIOLATES CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL STANDARDS, 
The circumstances arising from and surrounding the seizure of the alleged "meth" 
require that the seizure be suppressed in order to assure Mr. Bertoch of constitution 
standards of due process and equal protection of the law. The Court is respectfully referred 
to the timeline (with number fact paragraphs) to demonstrate the that must be reached here. 
After taking Mr. Bertoch to the jail - presumably not because he had failed to display 
his license plate in an approved manner- but because Trooper Witte suspected him of being 
under the influence of alcohol or marijuana or its metabolite (a "suspicion" subsequently 
disproved by chemical analysis), a jail deputy searched Mr. Bertoch and allegedly found, 
according to Trooper Witte, a "white" plastic battery case at 2245 on the night of the Stop. 
On two reports prepared by Trooper Witte, Trooper Witte describes the battery case as 
"white" and containing a white powdery substance. 
Trooper Witte placed the "white" plastic battery case into his own pocket. 
Trooper Witte carried the "white" plastic battery case around in his own pocket until he 
went to an evidence locker approximately two miles away from the jail where Mr. Bertoch was 
being held at 0025, 10 minutes - one hour and forty minutes - after the jailer allegedly 
conducted the search. Trooper Witte describes the batter case in the Incident Report dated 
17
 Mr. Bertoch does not here claim that any of the law enforcement officers treated him with "unnecessary rigor" 
under Utah Constitution Article I Section 9 or that they acted cruelly or unusually under the Eight Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. He does request the Court to infer and to conclude that the circumstances 
primarily described by an educated and very well-prepared witness, as Trooper Witte confidently portrayed 
himself at the Preliminary Hearing, demonstrate the stress, discomfort and overwhelming context and nature of 
Mr. Bertoch's experience and the ease with which a forthcoming laborer can become enmeshed into an 
accusatory and even intimidating atmosphere of criminal allegation, incarceration and personal/physical loss. 
ftziQo Mn n n i - Q I Q ' W v Tmvis Rprfnrh Memorandum Sunnnrfinn Mnfinn fn Sunnmss &fr Paae 19 of 28 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9/20/01 at 12:25 a.m. (0025 in military time). Trooper Witte described the battery case as 
"white" in the "No Warrant Arrest Fact Sheet" printed on 09/19/01 at 23:12. 
But, the Evidence and Property Report, {Ex. H}, which describes the chain of custody 
of the batter case from the jail deputy at 2245 on 09/19/01 to Trooper Witte at 2245 on 
09/19/01 (when Trooper Witte placed the white batter case in his pocket), the battery case 
placed into Locker Number 558 by Trooper Witte at 0025 on 09/20/01 and then leaves the 
Locker for the Crime Lab at 1000 on 09/20/01 is not white but is "clear" The Clerk named as 
the Section 16 Evidence Custodian and as the Clerk Receiving Property initialed the form 
describing a "small clear, plastic battery case containing a white powdery substance." 
{Emphasis added} 
By the time the probable cause statement is attached to the Information for review by 
a Deputy District Attorney on December 13, 2001, the battery case has become "a plastic 
container with a white powdery substance." 
The witness and evidence list describe the alleged "evidence" as "white crystal 
powder" without reference to its container. 
How did the "white" battery case described by Trooper Witte as having been found by 
the jail deputy and handed by the jail deputy to Trooper Witte at 2245 and described by 
Trooper Witte as being "white" in a report printed at 2325 and in a report completed at 0025 
after being carried in Trooper Witte's pocket for 100 minutes turn into a "clear" container 
when placed into the locker and when removed from the locker? Trooper Witte went 
approximately two miles from the jail where he took Mr. Bertoch to the Section 16 office at 
some point after 2245. He does not describe having a partner with him. 
Perhaps because the discrepancy from a white battery case to a clear battery case 
was noticed, the unsigned probable cause statement submitted to the Deputy District 
Attorney as part of the Information refers only to a "plastic container." The evidence allegedly 
supporting the first count (felony possession of methamphetamine) then become a "white 
crystal powder" without reference to any kind of container- but the "evidence" allegedly 
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supporting the charge of marijuana possession is the systematically and consistently 
described container and contents "small baggy with green leafy substance." 
No one can possibly determine beyond reasonable doubt just what color of container 
was allegedly found by the jail deputy and put into the pocket of Trooper Witte - where it 
allegedly remained for 100 minutes - before it became a "clear" battery case before 
becoming a "plastic container" for purposes of the probable cause statement on the 
Information. Somewhere between the alleged discovery of the "white" battery case and the 
delivery of the "clear" battery case to the evidence clerk, the battery case becomes different. 
It is enough "different" to become an undescribed "plastic" container about 84 days later, 
December 13, 2001. 
The only real "evidence" of felony possession of methamphetamine is thus tainted, 
unreliable - and the alleged chain of custody is flawed and impeached by the records of the 
Utah Highway Patrol. We do not know why Trooper Witte describes a "white" plastic battery 
case having been given to him at 2245 by the jail deputy, still described as "white" plastic in 
the report printed at 2312 and in the report completed at 0025 - yet placed in a locker as 
"clear" plastic at the same time and transferred to the crime lab at 1000 as "clear" - and back-
stated on the chain of custody as having been "clear" when first found and given to Trooper 
Witte. All we know is that the official UHP documents describe two colors for the batter/ 
case: white and clear and that the subsequent probable cause affidavit drops the description 
from either white or clear and refers only to a "plastic" container and the evidence list refers to 
"white crystal powder." We have no way to determine where any white crystal powder came 
from - at least without finding a gross inconsistency in the chain of custody and without 
looking for the unexplained change that occurs in the records during the 100 minutes in 
Trooper Witte's pocket - or at least in the 9 hours and 35 minutes between the deposit into 
the Locker to the delivery to the crime lab. 
No one can be asked to defend against such indefinite "evidence" and such 
inconsistent assertions. No one can legitimately be convicted beyond a reasonable doubt by 
alleged "evidence" with such a checkered and inconsistent history. The so-called "evidence," 
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now consisting only of a white crystal powder, must be suppressed; it is now inherently and 
unquestionably lacking in probity and in legitimacy. The facts produced by the prosecution 
through the law enforcement officers are exculpatory; the facts require suppression/ 
THE EXPANSION OF THE STOP 
FROM A TRAFFIC VIOLATION 
TO AN ARREST FOR AN ALLEGED FELONY 
AROSE FROM PROFILING, 
NOT FROM ANY LEGITIMATE CONCERNS 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Constitution 
requires that the States accord equal protection of the law to all persons. The Utah 
Constitution requires uniform operation of law. Utah's Constitution affirms that Utah is 
inseparable from the Union of the States, that is the United States, and thus its total 
adherence to the Constitution of the United States. The Utah Constitution guarantees the free 
exercise political thought and free expression and uniform operation of law. {See United 
States Constitution, Amendment 14; Utah Constitution, Article I, Sections 1,2 3, 24.} These 
noble and, in many cases, self-executing principles of constitutional government, form the 
backdrop against which the Stop of Mr. Bertoch, a man with a shaved head and tattoos on 
his arms, must be examined. 
The current and lively national debate over profiling by law enforcement officials in 
performing their actions, primarily in a racial context, began shortly after the horrendous and 
devastating attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, only 8 days before the 
arrest of Mr. Bertoch. Because the attacks have been attributed to a group of radical 
terrorists of one religious and ethnic background, a number of ugly, vengeful and allegedly 
retaliatory acts were committed in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, including an arson at 
a restaurant near 2100 South State in Salt Lake City and the denial of transport to two 
persons with airline tickets from Minnesota to Salt Lake City. 
The President has gravely counseled agafnst retaliatory behavior and blanket pre-
judgments on any basis, as have numerous other national and local leaders in varying walks 
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of life. Enhanced airport safety measures and calls for greater citizen vigilance and diligent 
reporting of suspicious activities and conduct has been counseled, but those are not to be 
based upon personal appearance, ethnicity, religious practice, political statements or any 
other prejudice. 
The concerns about terrorism and retaliation, quite logically, have given rise to a 
lengthy debate over and allegations that law enforcement at all levels engages in profiling -
racial or ethnic profiling garnering the greatest amount of attention - with religious and even 
political discrimination inherent in the debate and the search for preservation of rights and 
freedom while defending against terrorism and even other misconduct. 
From the totality of the circumstances set forth by law enforcement in the reports and 
statements in this case and from the supplemental information that Mr. Bertoch has tattoos 
on both of his arms and shaves his head and from Mr. Bertoch's appearance at the 
Preliminary Hearing and other court appearances, this Court can see and can conclude that 
Mr. Bertoch looks like a "skinhead." Like a number of other ethnic, religious or political 
groups that can be identified visually, being a "skinhead" carries a prejudged and thus a 
prejudicial burden upon those who look like skinheads. The reputation of skinheads, as a 
group, is based on rumor, assertion and sometimes upon a few facts about specific 
circumstances, specific issues and specific persons who identify themselves as "skinheads." 
These generalizations expand - like any other stereotype - to impugn all those who look like 
members of the "skinheads" category or classification. 
Evidence of a prejudicial attitude toward "skinheads" can be inferred from the law 
enforcement statements and testimony in this case. Although Trooper Witte specifically 
claims in his written reports that he observed an improperly displayed license plate and never 
himself mentioned the absence of the trunk lid on Mr. Bertoch's car, at the Preliminary 
Hearing Trooper Witte testified forcefully that the absence of the trunk lid, while admitting that 
is not in itself illegal, constitutes "suspicion." He followed the car at slow speed for some two 
miles, about 16 minutes before making the Stop, although the improper display of the plate 
was easily noticed. Trooper Witte also states that he decided against running the license 
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plate (which he saw on the shelf behind the back seat of the car) until some time after he 
instituted the Stop. Rather than checking the plate, Trooper Witte removed Mr. Bertoch from 
his car and frisked him for weapons - although the worst thing Officer Witte observed while 
he followed Mr. Bertoch for approximately 16 minutes from Redwood Road and SR 201 
(approximately 2100 South) to 1-15 and then onto I-80 near State Street was the improper 
display of a license plate and the absence of a trunk lid. 
Just what "suspicion" does the absence of a trunk lid raise? 
If the driver had been a 50-year old woman with gray hair, the "suspicion" would be 
that her trunk lid had been damaged or its springs/closing devices had been broken and she 
was awaiting repair and replacement of the lid. 
If the driver had been a clean-cut college student with a tan, the "suspicion" could 
easily have been that the student had been hauling his lawn mower and tools around to 
provide landscape services as his summer job - or that he was getting ready to haul a snow 
blower around in hopes of going from landscaping to snow removal as the fall season went 
from warm weather to winter. 
If the driver worked with a scaffolding company crew, as does Mr. Bertoch, the 
"suspicion" should have been that he hauled equipment to and from job sites - or that he also 
did landscaping work or anticipated performing snow removal or had suffered damage to his 
trunk lid or its springs and was awaiting repair - or any number of other legitimate and logical 
reasons why someone would drive his car while the trunk lid was missing. 
And the fact that Trooper Witte could see that a license plate was lying flat in front of 
the rear window could even have raised another "suspicion:" that the driver had leaned the 
license plate against the window so it would be visible, but as the driver went along, he had 
hit bumps or turned corners, causing the license plate to fall into a flat position. 
But not Trooper Witte, who could see the license plate lying flat and must just as easily 
have seen a "skinhead" and possibly even the tattoos as he followed his lidless suspect at a 
slow speed for some 16 minutes. The "receiving of stolen property" line on an official report 
seems in fact reveal part of Trooper Witte's thinking and his profile: an absent trunk lid and a 
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"skinhead" with tattoos on his arms: "skinheads" receive stolen property or participate in other 
illegal activities - they even carry arms or contraband. Why a "skinhead" would lay the 
license plate on the back of the seat where Officer Witte could see it doesn't fit - so leave it 
aside. Mr. Bertoch was profiled - here is a skinhead without a trunk lid, therefore he must be 
involved in illegal activity. Mr. Bertoch waited a long while before Trooper Witte or someone 
else ran the license plate - only to discover that the plate indicated a valid and unexpired 
registration to Mr. Bertoch and the driver's license was restricted only by the requirement that 
Mr. Bertoch wear corrective lenses when he drives. 
It is true that Trooper Witte alleges that he smelled the odor of alcohol coming from Mr. 
Bertoch - that is Trooper Witte's initial statement. He then, prior to giving any Miranda 
warnings, questions Mr. Bertoch who responds (and whose responses should be 
suppressed, as previously set forth) that he drank two beers about 90 to 120 minutes earlier 
- and that he used marijuana the previous night. These remarks come from a truthful and 
cooperative man - one who did not fully realize the consequences of his truthful statements. 
Once Trooper Witte filled out the pre-prepared form for UHP DUI reports, the prejudice 
and pre-judgment of the UHP was revealed: Trooper Witte started with the odor of alcohol 
allegedly coming from Mr. Bertoch, but the UHP DUI Report pre-judges and pre-reports the 
allegation as not just the alleged odor of alcohol, but the "odor of an alcoholic beverage." 
Officer Witte adopts the "alcoholic beverage" description in his own writings, not just in 
filling out the mandatory, expected pre-prepared form, and places the alleged and newly 
described odor of a beverage on Mr. Bertoch's breath. 
But the alleged odor of alcohol coming from Mr. Bertoch or the later-alleged odor of an 
alcoholic beverage on Mr. Bertoch's breath need not have delayed Trooper Witte from 
"running" the license plate - especially since the records would have informed Officer Witte 
whether Mr. Bertoch had prior DUI arrests or had a stolen vehicle - which he did not. The 
information from checking the plate and the license is at least partially exculpatory - the 
common process of "running" license plates provides context, background and even some 
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amount of exculpation - but Trooper Witte preferred to turn elsewhere first because he had a 
"skinhead" and one with tattoos on his arms. 
Trooper Witte observed green coloring and blisters on Mr. Bertoch's tongue - in the 
absence of medical information, Trooper Witte should only have speculated that the green 
coloring came from drinking green Kool Aid or sucking on green Skittles candy - or even from 
those vivid bubble gum balls that temporarily stain kids' mouths ghastly green, blasphemous 
blue or perilous pink. 
The blisters on the tongue could indicate canker sores from allergies or small boils -
which might be helped by a mouthwash containing alcohol. Even with the volunteered 
information about two beers earlier in the evening, Trooper Witte could not truly conclude that 
the alleged odor of alcohol would emanate from Mr. Bertoch for almost two hours after he 
drank beer (information, again, that must be suppressed). 
This is a case that arises from profiling. The officer saw a tattooed skinhead and 
convinced himself that the man had to be guilty of something beside an improper plate. He 
allegedly smelled alcohol, at first just coming from Mr. Bertoch but consistent with the UHP's 
pre-prepared form, transformed into the odor of an "alcoholic beverage" coming from Mr. 
B<ertoch's breath. The truthful statement (that must be suppressed) that Mr. Bertoch drank 
some beer about 2 hours earlier was not enough to indicate driving under the influence - nor 
was the statement (that must be suppressed) that Mr. Bertoch had smoked marijuana about 
26 hours before the stop. 
Had Mr. Bertoch been something other than a man with a skinhead and tattoos on his 
arms, Trooper Witte would have undoubtedly exercised his experience - and even his 
caution -wi th greater wisdom, checking the ownership of the vehicle and the driving record 
(with no prior dui arrests or convictions) and could have come to a better conclusion. Blood 
shot eyes, like canker sores, arise from allergies - and September 2001 was far from free of 
allergy-producing plants (which the Court may notice). Lack of balance from a man with two 
past broken ankles and a painful, crushed toe is not surprising. Nystagmus and blood shot 
eyes partly explain Mr. Bertoch's need for glasses - which were in his car. Because Mr. 
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Bertoch looks like a skinhead with tattoos, he is not granted the benefit of alternative 
reasoning by Trooper Witte. Profiling was present, active and basic to this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments and upon the documents as produced in 
discovery, the statements by Mr. Bertoch and the items seized from him must be suppressed. 
Even more, all of the charges - with the exception of the improper display of the license plate 
not here challenged - must be dismissed with prejudice. Mr. Bertoch should be granted such 
other and further relief as may be just and proper. 
Dated: April 19, 2002. 
Respectfullysubmitted, 
4c^ 
% 
M. Karlynn Hinnjan ^ 
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ARGUMENT 
The Terry Frisk: The Pipe, Plastic Bag of "Green Leafy" Substance and Papers 
Should be Suppressed. Plaintiff has not challenged the decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court setting forth the scope of an initial Terry frisk. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968). The first part of Plaintiffs answering brief admits the search that located the pipe 
was part of a frisk. The arresting Trooper admits the pipe he allegedly felt in Mr. Bertoch's 
trousers pocket could have been used for tobacco as well as for marijuana, although he 
over-anxiously testified that he had felt a pipe with marijuana residue in Mr. Bertoch's 
pocket. Transcript of Preliminary Hearing ("Tr.") page 22 line 25 - page 23 line 3.1 
Since the Trooper was so certain what he had found (the pipe) during the frisk, he 
knew he was in no danger from the item he felt - and he felt nothing else in the pockets or 
on the person of Mr. Bertoch to cause him any concern about weapons or other things that 
could be harmful to him.2 The Trooper's search exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk and 
the items seized at the scene of the stop should be suppressed, as argued more 
extensively in the initial brief. 
Plaintiff cannot protect the seizures made in violation of Terry by arguing the items 
would have been located later anyway - Mr. Bertoch was entitled to the constitutional and 
legal protections carefully stated in Terry and its progeny, including Minnesota v. 
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993), when the frisk began - a constitutional right cannot be so 
easily denied as the Plaintiff would have this Court rule. 
Mr. Bertoch's Statements at the Stop Should Be Suppressed. Plaintiff, after ignoring 
entirely the legal scope and legal constraints on a Terry frisk, argues that the seizure of the 
pipe felt through Mr. Bertoch's pocket and the small plastic bag fished out of another 
1
 The Transcript was to be attached as Exhibit M to the opening brief. The certified transcript, completed by 
a court reporting service on Friday, June 7, 2002, is being filed with the Court. A copy of the "four-page per 
page" version is attached to this Brief for the convenience of the Court. 
During the Preliminary Hearing, the Trooper testified only briefly about the topic of officer's safety, the 
rubric that allegedly justifies extensive searches and other police conduct in pre-arrest and arrest situations. 
Here the Trooper said, in substance, he wanted to make the stop at a safe location because he had been 
rear-ended twice. The driver of a stopped car cannot cause rear-ending when the driver has been removed 
from the car. See Tr. page 13 lines 9-15. 
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pocket are part of a lawful seizure in connection with an arrest for paraphernalia. Having 
made this argument as a post-Terry justification for seizure of alleged paraphernalia, 
Plaintiff is now governed by the requirements of Miranda. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966). If Mr. Bertoch was under arrest and the Trooper questioned him, then the 
statements allegedly made by Mr. Bertoch must be suppressed because, according to the 
records prepared by or under the direction of the Trooper, Mr. Bertoch was not given 
Miranda warnings until well after the initial stop - after he had been Ter/y-frisked, 
questioned, in-fact searched, given field sobriety tests, transported to the street near a gas 
station for a blood test and finally taken to a jail facility where the Trooper's records report 
the reading of Miranda. 
Plaintiffs arguments are internally inconsistent and create a dilemma: either the 
search was a Terry frisk prior to arrest so items obviously not weapons could not be 
removed then used as evidence of criminal activity (here, possession of paraphernalia and 
possession of marijuana) and must be suppressed or Mr. Bertoch was immediately under 
arrest and thus was entitled to Miranda warnings and anything he might have said should 
be suppressed. 
The resolution of the dilemma created by the Plaintiffs arguments is simple: a 
Defendant cannot be convicted if the prosecution picks and chooses what legal restraints 
apply at what times - the Plaintiffs case must fail because of suppression; the Defendant 
is entitled to legal and constitutional protection. 
Plaintiffs Citation of Authority Misinterprets the Law and Pertinent Facts. In citing a 
case from the Utah Supreme Court, Plaintiff argues at one point that Miranda did not apply 
to a routine traffic stop. A routine traffic stop is one that results in a warning ticket or a 
citation for some kind of traffic violation - whether it be driving with an improperly displayed 
license plate or speeding. When the routine traffic stop becomes something else, 
constitutional standards, including Miranda apply. Although the Plaintiff argues that Mr. 
Bertoch's statements before he received Miranda warnings should not be suppressed 
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because his statements occurred during a traffic stop, the argument is belied by at least 
three crucial factors. 
First, the traffic stop was not routine because the Trooper demonstrated no intention 
whatsoever to issue a mere citation for improper display of a license plate - he could have 
run the plate number for the plate that was resting near the back window if that had been 
his interest, but he thought he might have a stolen vehicle, Tr. page 15 line 9, (because the 
trunk was absent even though it was clear to him that a license plate was near the back 
window of the trunkless car) but allegedly smelled alcohol (later an "alcoholic beverage") 
coming from Mr. Bertoch's person (making the stop immediately something other than a 
routine traffic stop). 
Second, the Trooper testified that Mr. Bertoch was not free to go when the Trooper 
was investigating the alleged alcohol. Tr. page 24 lines 6 - 1 0 . 
Third, the Utah Supreme Court has examined, in the case cited by Plaintiff, when 
Miranda applies. See Plaintiff's Answering Brief, page 3 Argument I, referring to Salt Lake 
Cityv. Womack, 747 P.2d 1039, 1042 (Utah 1987) {citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 
420,440(1984)). 
The United States Supreme Court, in the case cited by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Womack, carefully distinguishes between a routine traffic stop when the motorist 
reasonably expects he will be questioned about routine matters such as his identify, his 
vehicle and its licensing. (A printout of Berkemer is attached for the Court's convenience.) 
The motorist has no obligation to answer the questions, but the Miranda warnings are not 
mandatory when the stop is brief, the motorist remains in his vehicle and the stop involves 
some kind of traffic matter resolved by a traffic citation or ticket. 
Here, the Trooper converted the routine stop by his actions and by his reports of 
what he allegedly believed. He testified that the absence of a trunk and the license plate 
resting flat near the rear window on a car was a "suspicion." Tr. pages 14 line 25 to 
pagel 5 line 11. As a "suspicion," these factors justify only a Terry frisk - not the seizure 
State v. Bertoch, Case No. 01-1919305: Defendant's Reply Brief re Motion to Suppress 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of something the Trooper immediately knew was not a weapon. The Trooper could not 
seize. 
Once the Trooper allegedly smelled alcohol and allegedly saw reddened eyes,3 the 
Trooper converted the routine stop to something much more important: he was detaining 
Mr. Bertoch as a suspect for the crime of driving under influence of alcohol (as well as the 
Trooper's pre-conceived notion that Mr. Bertoch was driving a stolen car because his car 
lacked a trunk). At that point, Mr. Bertoch was entitled to Miranda warnings and was, in 
fact, being detained. The Trooper could question but Plaintiff cannot expect any alleged 
statements by Mr. Bertoch to be admitted. Any statements attributed to Mr. Bertoch must 
be suppressed. 
Nothing Can Overcome "Reasonable Doubt" about the Container of Alleged 
Methamphetamine. Rather than explaining why a small container allegedly removed from 
Mr. Bertoch's pocket during a search at the jail could begin as a "white" container but 
would be described in documents accepted several hours later by an evidence clerk as a 
"clear" container, Plaintiff says that Defendant and his counsel will be able to observe the 
alleged "evidence" at trial. That is no answer. 
No matter what container is produced at trial, it is impossible to determine what 
alleged container was at the jail and what alleged container was received by a clerk for 
testing or storage as alleged evidence. The problem exists because of the records 
compiled by the prosecution, including those records and reports prepared and produced 
for and on behalf of the arresting Trooper. This is not just a weakness in the chain of 
custody; this is far more serious. The two descriptions of an alleged piece of evidence go 
to the heart of the evidence: the evidence cannot be identified from the records prepared 
3
 Plaintiffs Answering Brief, page 4, paragraph 2, line 4 of the paragraph, claims Mr. Bertoch's speech was 
"slurred." That assertion is not supported by the testimony of the Trooper and is not supported by any 
statement in the discovery documents that have been produced. The Trooper wrote that Mr. Bertoch was 
"slow," not that he was "slurred." The notion of "slurred" speech introduces a concept, connotation and fact 
not in evidence and should be stricken. 
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by and on behalf of the prosecution. And those records were made shortly after the arrest 
of Mr. Bertoch by the officials involved in the arrest and procedures surrounding the arrest. 
Even if the Trooper, the jail Deputy, the evidence Clerk and the typists who worked 
on the reports are called to testify, their testimony in June 2002, approximately nine 
months after the date of the arrest, will be long after the events of September 19, 2001, the 
time of arrest. Moreover, it is doubtful that any one of the possible witnesses will have an 
independent recollection of the circumstances surrounding the September 19, 2001 event. 
Defendant requests the Court to take notice of these common facts: Clerks at the Section 
16 facilities of the Utah Highway Patrol (see Exhibit H to Defendant's initial Memorandum)4 
receive items to be held as evidence virtually every single day of their employment - and 
likely received more items on some days than on others. They cannot be expected to 
have an independent recollection of an item identified in a signed or initialed report 
prepared several months ago. 
Those persons engaged to assist in typing reports - assuming that they are not the 
Troopers themselves - use pre-prepared forms and are undoubtedly engaged with a daily 
work load commensurate with their ranks and status as members of the Utah Highway 
Patrol. They cannot be expected to remember individual reports or the information given 
to them in assisting with the preparation of a report. 
Deputies assigned to the Salt Lake County jail facilities to assist with processing 
new arrestees undoubtedly have seen more persons arrested for alleged drug violations 
during the past nine months than just one or two. They cannot be expected to provide 
testimony now that would specifically clarify what was allegedly seized or why the allegedly 
seized container was described in different ways on the same night as the arrest. 
The Trooper testified "Also, as a Highway Patrolman, I have made numerous 
arrests for controlled substance, many of which are marijuana." Tr. page 9 lines 1 - 4 . 
4
 According to Exhibit H, Utah Highway Patrol Section 16 "Special Operations" Evidence and Property 
Report, the "clear'1 container was placed in an evidence locker at 0025 (just after midnight on September 20, 
2001) and received by the property clerk at 10:00 a.m. on September 20, 2001, almost ten hours later. At 
the Preliminary Hearing, the Trooper described the container as "white." Tr. page 10 linel. 
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The alleged container of methamphetamine is simply unreliable evidence - not 
because of anything done or not done by Mr. Bertoch, but because of the written 
statements made and prepared on the night of the incident are inconsistent, confused and 
cannot provide a reasonable basis for the identification of alleged evidence central to the 
charge brought against Mr. Bertoch. 
Because of the unreliability of the sole and central evidence of the charge of alleged 
possession of methamphetamine (the single felony charge in this matter), the alleged 
evidence must be suppressed and the charge dismissed - the Court need not allow the 
prosecution to take this charge beyond this motion. 
The Profiling Issue. Mr. Bertoch, with shaved head and tattoos on his arms, could be a 
member of the so-called "skinheads," a loose group of white males who allegedly hold 
militant ideas or who behave in a militant or threatening manner to assert their own notions 
and positions with respect to the rights and interests of others. The Utah Highway Patrol 
forms describe Mr. Bertoch as having "blond" hair- but the only evidence introduced in 
support of this motion that was not produced on behalf of the prosecution (by the Utah 
Highway Patrol or by affidavits from offices or persons associated with the prosecution) is 
the brief affidavit from Mr. Bertoch's brother stating that Mr. Bertoch has never had blond 
hair and that his head was shaved on September 19, 2001 when he was arrested. 
Once again, the discovery documents indicate the haste and carelessness of 
authorities underlying the charges in this case. No one paid enough attention to get the 
hair color correct - but anyone observing Mr. Bertoch could see that his head was shaved 
and that, if his arms are uncovered (as they had to be when the blood sample was taken 
street side at 2100 South and State Street), he has tattoos. These factors are part of the 
stereotype for "skinheads," a prejudicial and often politically disparaging grouping or 
category, a banality, even an insult. People who look like skinheads are notices for 
precisely the characteristic that gives the group its name: skinheads. 
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The Court is requested to notice that skinhead is a term of disparagement used to 
evoke prejudice, suspicion and even accusation based upon an obvious physical 
characteristic: a white male with a shaved head. 
Was there profiling? While not admitted by any person or agency, profiling is 
virtually automatic based upon experience and observation - and here, with "suspicion" 
aroused because of the absence of a trunk on a car - the suspicion was magnified when 
Mr. Bertoch was observed. A subjective factor? Yes, of course. An insult to law 
enforcement? Not intended, but the protest is Shakespearean. Profiling is not the crux of 
this motion; the violation of Mr. Bertoch's rights and the need to suppress alleged evidence 
and statements is the central point. The motion must be granted with respect to all matters 
raised. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the initial brief, the documents and discovery materials 
provided by the prosecution, the transcript of the preliminary hearing, the dilemmas raised 
by the prosecutions brief and for the foregoing reasons, Mr. Bertoch requests that his 
motion be granted and that all charges be dismissed. 
Dated: June 10,2002 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
JACKSON, Presiding Judge: 
* 1 Frank Zepeda challenges the trial court's denial of 
his motion to suppress, arguing (i) that the officer did 
not have probable cause to stop Zepeda's vehicle, and 
(ii) that the evidence and confession obtained during 
the stop were obtained in violation of Zepeda's Fifth 
Amendment Miranda rights. We affirm. 
Zepeda first argues that, insofar as he was preparing 
to make a right-hand turn, he was justified in 
operating his vehicle outside of the normal lane of 
travel. This contention is not supported by the Utah 
Code, however, which clearly states that right-hand 
turns are to "be made as close as practical to the 
right-hand curb or edge of the roadway" Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6- 66(1) (1998) (emphasis added). Given 
the clear statutory distinction between the "roadway" 
and the "shoulder," compare Utah Code Ann. §41-6-
1(41) (Supp.2002) (defining "roadway" as the 
"portion of highway ... ordinarily used for vehicular 
travel, exclusive of the ... shoulder ") (emphasis 
added) with id. § 41-6-1(45) (defining "shoulder 
area" as "that area of the hard- surfaced highway 
separated from the roadway by a pavement edge 
line"), it is clear that Zepeda was required by law to 
stay within the proper confines of the roadway while 
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preparing to make his right-hand turn. 
Zepeda also argues that his use of the breakdown 
lane was justified by the fact that he was traveling at a 
slow rate of speed. This contention is incorrect. 
Under Utah law, "a vehicle proceeding at less than 
the normal speed of traffic ... shall be operated in the 
right-hand lane then available for traffic, or as close 
as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the 
roadway." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-53(2) (1998). By 
its express terms, Utah law allows for travel only in 
the "lane" or "roadway." Here, insofar as Zepeda was 
admittedly traveling outside of the defined 
"roadway," his use of the "breakdown lane" was not 
justified by his rate of speed. Thus, insofar as the 
officer personally observed Zepeda's illegal operation 
of his vehicle, we hold that the traffic stop was 
justified. [FN1] 
FN1. Zepeda also argues that his failure to 
operate his vehicle in a regular lane of 
traffic was caused by "faint or non-existent" 
markings at the side of the road. Zepeda 
fails to cite any legal authority, however, 
that would indicate that such a condition 
invalidates the officer's probable cause to 
effectuate a traffic stop. We accordingly 
decline to address the argument. See Smith 
v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 
2003 UT 23,1 46, 70 P.3d 904 (citations 
omitted). 
Zepeda next argues that the trial court erred in not 
suppressing Zepeda's admissions to the officer 
regarding his marijuana use. Specifically, Zepeda 
argues that the officer's conduct at the traffic stop 
subjected him to a custodial interrogation, thereby 
mandating Miranda warnings. 
"It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by 
Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's 
freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated 
with formal arrest.' " Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 
420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 (1984) (citation 
omitted). In Berkemer, the United States Supreme 
Court specifically held that though "a traffic stop 
significantly curtails the 'freedom of action' " of the 
driver, id. at 436, 104 S.Ct. at 3148, the stop does not 
become custodial for Miranda purposes unless the 
circumstances of the stop "exert[ ] upon [the] 
detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his 
free exercise of his privilege against self-
incrimination." Id at 437, 104 S.Ct. at 3149. Thus, 
"[a] person may be 'seized' for Fourth Amendment 
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purposes but not be 'in custody' for Fifth Amendment 
purposes." State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 
(Utah 1996). 
*2 "To determine if a person is in custody... we look 
to ' "(1) the site of the interrogation; (2) whether the 
investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether the 
objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the 
length and form of interrogation." ' " State v. 
Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 81 (Utah Ct.App.1998) 
(quoting Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147). In accordance 
with these factors, we hold that the circumstances 
here were not such that Zepeda's privilege against 
self-incrimination was impaired. First, the site in 
which the questioning occurred was decidedly non-
custodial, as the questioning occurred not in the 
intimidating confines of a patrol car or at the police 
station, but rather while Zepeda was in his own car. 
Compare Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147; Brandley, 972 
P.2d at 83. Second, at the time of the questioning, it is 
apparent that the typical indicia of arrest, "such as 
readied handcuffs, locked doors or drawn guns," Salt 
Lake City v. Carrier, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 
1983), were not present. Third, the length and form of 
the interrogation were not such so as to resemble an 
arrest. There is no indication that the officer's 
questioning regarding the smell of marijuana 
emanating from Zepeda's car was accompanied by 
any direct accusations of illegal drug usage or by 
coercive orders that were calculated to induce Zepeda 
to confess to wrongdoing. Compare Mirquet, 914 
P.2d at 1147-48. Further, there is no indication that 
the officer raised his voice in a threatening manner so 
as to intimidate Zepeda into cooperating with his 
questioning. Compare Brandley, 972 P.2d at 82. 
Finally, neither the length of time involved in the 
traffic stop nor the nature of the questioning 
resembled that which is typically found in an arrest. 
Compare id. (holding that a questioning which lasted 
"only ten to fifteen minutes" was not unduly 
coercive). Instead, we find that the officer's conduct 
was entirely consistent with a non-custodial traffic 
stop. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err 
in ruling that Zepeda's confession and the evidence 
obtained as a result of that confession were 
admissible. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
WE CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME and 
WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Judges. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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